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The quantification of uncertainty is a key topic in different theories and 
accounts of the legal process, ranging from probabilism to explanationism. 
These accounts invoke probability to various extents. For legal probabilism, 
probability is the single core concept, whereas other accounts, such as the 
relative plausibility theory, give it a more limited role, as one consideration 
among others. At the same time, controversies persist about the nature of 
probability and the value it may add to the understanding of the broad range 
of aspects that characterise the legal process. These controversies arise, in 
part, from the fact that probability itself is the object of confusing debates in 
many scientific disciplines. In view of these intricacies, this paper argues that 
the critical analysis and clarification of how to understand and use probability 
meaningfully remains a topic worthy of investigation across different 
theoretical perspectives. The first part of this paper critically examines a 
selection of persisting misconceptions about probability and objections 
against its use, based on discussions presented in recent evidence law 
literature. Part II of this paper will blend this discussion with a particular view 
of probability, interpreted as a personal decision, rarely acknowledged in 
legal literature. Using a multidisciplinary perspective and a thorough review 
of historical sources, we illustrate and discuss how the understanding of 
probability assertion as a decision promotes transparency, honesty, 
accountability and justifiability. This decisional perspective is further 
developed and discussed in Part III to show that its logical ingredients 
underpin key concepts of different theoretical accounts, in particular the 
assertion of degrees of belief, assessments of relative plausibility and verdicts 
about ultimate issues at trial. Overall, the paper makes the point that the 
isolated debates over probability, legal probabilism and reasoning under 
uncertainty misconceive the primary problem of the legal process, which is 
decision-making under uncertainty. The proposed decisional perspective 
clarifies these issues both analytically and descriptively, and resolves 





Doctrine and policy on evidentiary proof processes in criminal and civil 
cases, across modern legal systems, commonly invoke the understanding that 
decision makers1 ought to consider the degree to which they are convinced 
                                               
1 Throughout this paper we will use ‘decision makers’ as a generic term in place of 
judges and jurors.  
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that particular legal elements are established, before making a decision. In a 
given case, decision makers need to address the question of whether they are 
sufficiently persuaded to decide in favour of a given party. The exact level of 
persuasion required – the standard of proof – applicable in a given case is an 
intricate evidentiary topic. While legal systems appear to leave it largely to 
decision makers to determine when a given level of proof is achieved in the 
case at hand, or a quantum of evidence was provided,2 there is a broad scope 
of legislation, jurisprudence and academic writing on how this level of 
satisfaction should be reached. On the one hand, notions such as 
“preponderance of the evidence” (or “balance of probabilities”) in civil cases, 
and “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, are commonly explained 
in overtly probabilistic terms.3 On the other hand, attempts by evidence 
scholars to provide a rigorously probabilistic account of standards of proof 
face a number of challenges and are the subject of decades-long debates.4  
In a recent paper, Professors Allen and Pardo5 review several accounts of 
the nature of juridical proof and argue in favour of a relative plausibility 
account (also called ‘explanatory account’). Unlike approaches that consider 
probability as a starting point to capture selected aspects of the legal proof 
process, Allen and Pardo start from the litigation process as a whole, and how 
it structures proof at trial. In a second step, they consider how relative 
plausibility, empirically and descriptively, fits with the legal system’s goals. 
Adherents of relative plausibility are not dismissive of probability, however, 
                                               
2 In some particular areas of application, such as paternity cases, it is common to refer 
to specific numerical thresholds.  
3E.g., Brown v. Bowen, 847 F.2d, 342 (7th Cir. 1988) (“All burdens of persuasion deal 
with probabilities.”), Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden 
of Proof, 55 Arizona Law Review 557–602 (2013), at 565 (“Burdens of proof easily bear a 
probabilistic interpretation.”), and for references to old cases see also James P. McBaine, 
Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 California Law Review 242–268 (1944). A pending 
question is, however, whether the use of the term ‘probability’ reflects the willingness to 
apply the calculus of probability or whether, as suggested by Haak, probability is understood 
merely as ‘degree of warrant’ (Susan Haak, Evidence Matters, Science, Proof, and Truth in 
the Law, 47–77, 2014). 
4 See, e.g., Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green (eds.), Probability and Inference in the Law of 
Evidence: The Uses and Limits of Bayesianism (1988), and the article collection edited by 
Ronald J. Allen & Mike Redmayne, Bayesianism in Juridical Proof, 1 International Journal 
of Evidence & Proof 253–360 (1997). More recently, see also Kevin M. Clermont, Standards 
of Decision in Law: Psychological and Logical Bases for the Standard of Proof, Here and 
Abroad (2013) and Dale A. Nance, The Burdens of Proof: Discriminatory Power, Weight of 
Evidence and Tenacity of Belief (2016). Historically, a hallmark in the critical review of 
evidence and proof accounts, especially legal probabilism that still echoes today, dates back 
to the early 1970 (Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal 
Process, 84 Harvard Law Review 1329–1393, 1971). 
5 Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, 23 
International Journal of Evidence & Proof 5–59 (2019).  
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because they consider probability to be one of the variables that inform 
judgments, among others aspects such as consistency, completeness and 
economy.6 But if probability has to play a role in evidential assessment and 
juridical proof, as this view suggests, then the proper understanding of 
probability is essential. This is an intricate topic mainly because probability 
itself is a controversial topic across scientific disciplines. Thus, the critical 
analysis, discussion and, if possible, resolution, of objections recurrently 
levelled against legal probabilism is a topic worthy of investigation for both 
adherents of the relative plausibility theory of trial and probabilistic-centered 
proponents of the trial rationale.  
In the first part of this paper, we critically review and discuss a selection 
of misconceptions of probability and objections against its use in legal 
settings observed in recent evidence law literature. Although several of these 
critiques have been formulated and known for a long time, the replies offered 
hitherto by evidence scholars and discussants from other domains, such as 
philosophy of science, appear to remain unconsidered or are felt to be 
unconvincing. In Part two of this paper, we seek to improve on this situation 
by building on de Finetti’s operational and decision-oriented perspective to 
probability.7 This is an unconventional account of probability and sceptical 
readers might immediately object to this framework as being incompatible 
with the values of the legal process, essentially because of the allegedly 
unconstrained subjectivist probability assignments that this perspective 
allows. We will explain in detail why this is a misconception of the 
personalist account of probability. Specifically, we will defend the view that 
the proper understanding of the personalist account actually encourages 
highly desirable values such as transparency, honesty, accountability and 
justifiability. We will substantiate this view with the help of a conceptual 
device that is based on the understanding of probability assertion as a 
personal decision, requiring careful reflection and the taking of 
responsibility. Further, we will argue that the debates over the suitability and 
nature of probability (objectivist, subjectivist or otherwise) in the legal setting 
distract from the principal issue and duty with which the legal process is 
concerned, which is decision under uncertainty. In Part three of this paper, 
we show that – conceptually – the notion of decision underpins key concepts 
ranging from the expression of degrees of belief in terms of either probability 
or plausibility, to verdicts at the end of the process. In this last part, we will 
                                               
6 Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof: Probability as a Tool in Plausible 
Reasoning, 21 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 133–142 (2017) at 140, Ronald J. 
Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary Inquiry, 1 International 
Journal of Evidence & Proof 254–275 (1997) at 274. 
7 Bruno de Finetti, Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment (1974; 
Reprint 2017). 
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discuss the analytical character of the proposed decisional perspective and 
distinguish it from its descriptive capacity. That is, our focus is not primarily 
on whether the formal approach to decision developed here provides a good 
description of how participants in the legal process actually behave. Instead, 
as we will argue, the decisional account captures the logical structure and 
inevitable ingredients of the decisional questions that any person required to 
act under uncertainty faces, irrespective of whether those actions are based 
on probability or on other concepts, as comprised in relative plausibility. As 
an aside, our analyses will also make the point that the mainstream debates 
over probability thresholds as bases for decisions are conceptually short-
sighted and, in this regard, rightly criticized. The decisional account that we 
invoke clarifies why both, analytically and descriptively, sensible decision-
making is not based on probability alone. 
Methodologically, our paper is multidisciplinary. It critically examines 
the use of formal methods of decision analysis in the law, based on a careful 
interpretation of their historical sources. This will lead us to refer frequently 
to the writings of Professors Allen and Pardo because they are a primary 
source of serious challenges on this topic.  
We insist on delineating this paper as focusing on probability, not on 
Bayes’ theorem, and even less on Bayesianism. Pure probabilists may view 
these distinctions as artificial because Bayes’ theorem is nothing but an 
inevitable consequence of the rules of probability. There is a difference, 
however, on a practical level. The full application of Bayes’ theorem in the 
legal context – also referred to as ‘judicial Bayesianism’8 – faces a host of 
challenges, ranging from the specification of relevance relationships (i.e., 
conditionalization), to the assessment of component probabilities and the 
limitations in computational capacities at the level of detail that the theory 
stipulates. A moderate probabilistic account,9 such as the one envisioned 
here, is primarily concerned with the coherent expression of uncertainties 
about target events in terms of probabilities. It is more readily defensible and 
admitted also by critics. As such, it is an important preliminary of judicial 
Bayesianism but also other approaches, such as relative plausibility, that 
                                               
8 Alex Stein, Judicial Fact-finding and the Bayesian Method: the Case for Deeper 
Scepticism About Their Combination, 1 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 25–47 
(1997), at 25. An example of proponents of judicial Bayesianism is Bernard Robertson & 
George A. Vignaux, Probability – The Logic of the Law, 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
457–478 (1993). For a defense of Bayesianism as an epistemology prescribing how one 
should answer the question of what to think or believe regarding particular propositions of 
interest, see Elliott Sober, Evidence and Evolution, The Logic Behind the Science (2008). 
9 Constructive and reconciling accounts of probability in the law can be found in the 
many writings of Professor Richard D. Friedman (e.g., Richard D. Friedman, The Persistence 
of the Probabilistic Perspective, 48 Seton Hall Law Review 1589–1600, 2018). 
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reserves at least a limited role to probability, among other considerations.10 
Thus, our concern here is only the nature and feasibility of probability 
assessments, regardless of whether they are direct assessments at the end 
point of an analysis, or component probability assessments that are either 
processed further using Bayes’ theorem (by those who wish to take this 
additional step),11 or used as parts of other accounts, such as relative 
plausibility.12 
 
PART 1: MISCONCEPTIONS REGARDING THE NATURE OF PROBABILITY AND 
RECURRENT OBJECTIONS AGAINST ITS USE IN THE LEGAL SETTING 
A.  Probability: the problem of where to start 
In a recent paper, Dahlman13 addresses the issue of how a coherent legal 
reasoner ought to set initial probabilities – commonly called ‘prior 
probabilities’ – about competing propositions of interest advanced by 
opposing parties at trial. The terms ‘initial’ and ‘prior’ are often used 
interchangeably to clarify that the probabilities under consideration refer to 
the view of the decision maker before acquiring new evidence. The feasibility 
of conceptually defining and defensibly assigning such probabilities is widely 
considered a key factor on which hinges the suitability of probability for 
dealing with uncertainty in the legal process.14 
The opening statement of Dahlman’s paper provides a good example of 
a series of convoluted topics that require careful discussion: “A Bayesian 
assessment of the probability that the defendant in a criminal trial is guilty 
depends on the presumed base rate for guilt and the estimated likelihoods of 
the evidence.”15 To scrutinise the foundations of  this statement, it is first 
necessary to recall the formal relationship between a proposition (or, 
hypothesis) H and an item of evidence E. Generally, the observation of an 
item of evidence E may strengthen, weaken or leave one’s belief in the truth 
                                               
10 Supra note 6. 
11 E.g., De Finetti, Probabilism: A Critical Essay on the Theory of Probability and on 
the Value of Science, 31 Erkenntnis 169–223 (1989), at 196. 
12 Allen (2017), supra note 6. 
13 Christian Dahlman, Determining the Base Rate of Guilt, 17 Law, Probability & Risk  
15–28 (2018). We mention this paper merely as an example. The assessment of initial (or 
so-called, prior) probabilities is a topic that also deeply perplexes scholars in areas other than 
the law, such as statistics and philosophy of science. 
14 This calls for reiteration of the conflicts that arise between properties of formal models 
and particular aspects of the justice process. This is illustrated, for example, by the 
controversies over the relationship between the specification of prior probabilities and legal 
presumptions, such as the presumption of innocence (e.g., David H. Kaye, The Probability 
of an Ultimate Issue: the Strange Case of Paternity Testing, 75 Iowa Law Review 75–109 
(1989); Richard D. Friedman, A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 Stanford 
Law Review 873–887 (2000)).   
15 Id. at 15. 
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of the proposition H unaffected, depending on the probative value of E.16 
However, the diagnosticity of the evidence E, by itself, does not entitle us to 
make an assertion about the probability of the proposition H. Coherently 
working out a probability for the proposition H given evidence E, using the 
rules of the probability calculus, requires a prior probability of H, i.e. a 
probability without the conditioning on E. How to specify this probability in 
legal applications is the question that Dahlman strives to answer, although 
there are several complications in his attempt.  
To start with, he refers to the prior probability as the base rate. This is a 
particular, but ill-conceived, definitional choice. As we will point out, it is at 
the heart of a host difficulties commonly ascribed to the probabilistic account 
of judicial proof.  
The notion of base rate relates to contexts in which the particular case to 
be assessed is thought of within the broader picture of background incidences 
of events of a comparable kind. Most typically, in medical diagnosis, the 
assessment of the probability that a particular person has a given disease, 
once the result of a diagnostic test has been obtained, requires one to take into 
account the prevalence of the disease in the population of interest. This, in 
turn, raises a plethora of interrogations about whether, and if so, how, relevant 
populations ought to be defined. This is generally known, legal literature 
included, as the ‘reference class problem’.17,18 Difficulties increase – to the 
point of becoming unmanageable – whenever one considers highly particular 
combinations of target features, which is all too common in real legal cases.19 
While these are valid challenges that demonstrate a “deep conceptual 
problem”20, it is important to recall that they are the consequence of a 
particular way to interpret and assess probabilities, and not – as we will argue 
throughout this paper – a problem of probability as such. 
                                               
16 In areas of application other than the law, probative value or strength of evidence is 
sometimes referred to as diagnostic or discriminative capacity. Probabilistically, the strength 
of the evidence depends on the probability of the evidence E if proposition H is true, 
compared to the probability of the evidence E given that proposition H is false. See, e.g., 
Colin Howson & Peter Urbach, Scientific Reasoning, The Bayesian Approach, Third Ed. 
(2006), Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Probative 
Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 Cornell Law Review 43–78 
(1996), Richard Friedman, The Elements of Evidence, Fourth Ed. (2017). 
17 E.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical 
Models of Evidence, 36 The Journal of Legal Studies 107–140 (2007).  
18 For example, if the target characteristic is ‘face tattoo’, the standard challenge posed 
by the reference class problem is that there is a variety of ways to define the reference 
population from which data is to be collected in order to quantify the background incidence 
of people with tattoos on their face. 
19 For examples showing that the reference class problem can be easily pushed ad 
absurdum see, e.g., Allen (2017), supra note 6, at 136. 
20 Supra note 17, at 109. 
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This is not to say that base rates are not a relevant concept in a variety of 
settings, such as clinical practice.21 It is relevant to inquire, however, whether 
they have any bearing on the inferences and decision problems encountered 
in legal cases. In its most general form the notion of base rate relates to the 
proportion of members of a given population that have a particular trait. It 
involves two ideas: (i) relative frequency, i.e. the number of times a particular 
observation is made, divided by the total number of observations, and (ii) 
long-run repetitions of particular experiments under the idealised assumption 
of stable (i.e. identical) conditions.22 In the last decades, these ideas have been 
used in attempts to define and apply probability in general, and in the law in 
particular. The persistence of these attempts is rather surprising, especially in 
more recent literature, because there are several well-grounded criticisms, 
known for a long time and to date unrefuted. In the legal literature, for 
example, Kaplan noted:  
“Given a typical contested trial, for instance, it is meaningless to 
speak of the probability of the defendant’s guilt in terms of the 
number of times he would be guilty in an infinite number of exactly 
similar cases because, first, there are not even two exactly similar 
cases, and, second, even if there were many identical cases the 
court must reach a verdict, not a ratio, in the case at bar.”23  
Similarly, Friedman observed: “Matters at issue in litigation tend to be 
one-time events. If Victor was murdered, it makes no sense to say, ‘The 
probability that in any given murder of Victor the murderer would be Dennis 
is 1 in 2’.”24 The mathematical and statistical literature is in line with these 
views.25  
                                               
21 For an early recognition of the importance of base rates see, e.g., Paul E. Meehl & 
Albert Rosen, Antecedent Probability and the Efficiency of Psychometric Signs, Patterns, or 
Cutting Scores, 52 Psychological Bulletin 194–216 (1955). 
22 Alternatively, base rates are also sometimes thought of in terms of the tendency (also 
referred to as propensity) of a procedure, applied across multiple instances, to lead to a 
particular outcome at any given instance of application (see, e.g., Howson & Urbach, supra 
note 16, at 24–25).  
23 John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stanford Law Review 
1066 (1968). 
24 Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 The International 
Journal of Evidence & Proof 276–291 (1997) at 276. Similarly, Allen & Stein, supra note 3, 
argue that courts “(...) do not base their decisions on the frequencies of events that resemble 
the event they are trying to reconstruct (even when those frequencies are available).” (at 567) 
25 See, e.g., Dennis V. Lindley, Probability, in: Colin G.G. Aitken & David A. Stoney 
(Eds.), The Use of Statistics in Forensic Science (1991): “What is the chance that the 
defendant is guilty? Are we to imagine a sequence of trials in which the judgements, ‘guilty’ 
or ‘not guilty’, are made and the frequency of the former found? It will not work (...). The 
whole idea of chance is preposterous in this context” (at 48) and Bruno de Finetti, 
Philosophical Lectures on Probability, Alberto Mura (Ed.) (2008): “The frequency with 
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The assertion that “the probability that the defendant in a criminal trial is 
guilty depends on the presumed base rate for guilt”26 thus is conceptually and 
definitionally unsound, but there are even more fundamental problems than 
trying to understand probability as a question of framing the relevant class or 
population, and the frequency of occurrence of selected features. Specifically, 
and we note this as an aside, it is unsound to refer to a ‘probability of guilt’ 
(or a “guilt-hypothesis”27) because guilt is not a hypothesis, but a legal 
conclusion.28 This renders the attempt to conceive of a way to “determining 
the base rate rate of guilt”29 pointless.  
Sure, probabilistic inference about any hypothesis of interest requires a 
probability to start from. The rules of probability say that one cannot make 
an assertion about the probability of a hypothesis, given particular evidence, 
without stating what one’s probability was before considering the evidence. 
The rules of probability do not require, however, one to determine the initial 
probability “according to some uniform recipe”30, especially not in some 
frequentist way. What is more, thinking that one could elaborate principles 
and abstract procedures that claim to produce probabilities from scratch, that 
is without reference to particular information, is epistemologically 
objectionable.31 
It follows from the above considerations that it is not meaningful to 
conceptualise a prior probability in the legal context in terms of a base rate. 
It might be objected that there are situations where base rates are available, 
such as in the following example: “Suppose, e.g. that a defendant was driving 
on a road where 60% of the drivers were intoxicated at the time when the 
defendant was stopped by the police. This would set the base rate for guilt at 
0.60 (...)”.32 The critical point here is the transition from the first to the second 
of the previous two sentences, which is not one of necessity. Strictly 
speaking, the 60% figure is data only. It is to be distinguished from the 
probability that a particular individual is indeed drunk, which is a distinct 
                                               
which certain events obtained or will obtain cannot be identified with probability. Frequency 
is a mere fact, independent of both the meaning of probability and the probability values 
assigned to the events” (at 138). 
26 Supra note 13, at 15, and similarly in Norman Fenton, David Lagnado, Christian 
Dahlman & Martin Neil, The Opportunity Prior: a Proof-Based Prior For Criminal Cases, 
Law, Probability & Risk (forthcoming, https://doi.org/10.1093/lpr/mgz007), (“assessing the 
probability that a suspect is guilty”, at 2).  
27 Supra note 13, at 16. 
28 E.g., Allen (1997), supra note 6, at 265, and Allen (2017), supra note 6, at 138. 
29 Supra note 13, at 15. 
30 Howson & Urbach, supra note 16, at 25. 
31 See, for example, Wesley C. Salmon, The Foundations of Scientific Inference (1967) 
for a critique of the indifference principle, considering it “epistemological magic” (at 66). 
32 Supra note 13, at 21. 
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issue.33 So, the question we are really interested in is the condition of a given 
individual or, to be more precise, our belief that this individual is in a 
particular state while having data on other individuals, supposedly 
comparable, in some sense, to the individual at hand. The key point is how to 
pin down this probability, because it does not follow directly from the 
available data. Lindley noted:  
“(...) you pass from a frequency among the patients seen, to a 
probability or belief about a further patient. This passage is so 
common that there has grown up a confusion between frequency, 
which refers to data, and probability, which is belief, so that people 
speak of the frequency interpretation of probability. There is a 
connection between the two concepts, but it is wrong to identify 
them (...)”.34,35 
Underlying this distinction is an alternative view of probability that 
interprets probabilities as measures of degrees of a person’s belief, referred 
to hereafter as personal or subjective probabilities. This type of probability 
refers to a person’s entirety of knowledge, rather than to a process that 
supposedly produces certain outcomes at a particular rate. The knowledge 
which conditions personal probabilities may, but need not necessarily, cover 
frequency data. It is thus possible to avoid the perceived inadequacies that 
derive from attempts to define and assess probabilities in terms of frequency 
data. In later sections of this paper, we will further build on and explain the 
fundamental difference between the definition and the assignment of 
probabilities. Although we recognize that personal probabilities face their 
own critiques, we will illustrate how to assess them in light of a broader 
framework wherein uncertainty measurement is understood as a decision. 
                                               
33 Indeed, rarely is one concerned with the abstract instance of selecting an individual in 
some unspecified way. In most cases, there is circumstantial information that influences 
one’s assessment of the probability that the person of interest is drunk, different from what 
the naked frequency data may suggest. For example, the person may exhibit suspicious 
driving behavior (such as speeding, unusually slow or insecure driving), have a vehicle 
showing recent damages or a missing number plate, etc. Interestingly, Dahlman himself 
considers the use of a base rate problematic in this example (“It may not be very realistic to 
imagine a situation where 60% are driving under the influence (...)”, supra note 13, at 21).  
34 Dennis V. Lindley, Understanding Uncertainty (2006), at 103. The same point has 
also been made by De Finetti (2008), supra note 25, at 128: “The frequency with which 
certain events obtained or will obtain cannot be identified with probability. Frequency is a 
mere fact, independent of both the meaning of probability and the probability values assigned 
to the events.” 
35 A formal argument to show that relative frequencies, where available, can be 
coherently related to a person’s probability for an event of interest relies on the notion of 
exchangeability. The technical details are beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion 
see, e.g., Franco Taroni et al., Reconciliation of Subjective Probabilities and Frequencies in 
Forensic Science, 17 Law, Probability & Risk 243–262 (2018). 
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B.  Likelihood and probability are not synonyms 
Legal scholarship on the use of probability in the law is further 
complicated by the confusion between likelihood and probability. Indeed, 
they are often treated as synonyms, or near synonyms. In everyday language, 
but also in the discourses of many learned scientists, saying that an outcome 
or event is ‘likely’ is often taken to mean that it is ‘probable’. Dahlman, for 
example, mentions “estimated likelihoods of the evidence”36 and, more 
specifically, “the likelihood of a false positive, i.e. the probability that such a 
match would occur with (...) a randomly picked innocent person.”37  
The difference between likelihood and probability is technically subtle, 
and conceptually important. From a formal point of view, the probability Pr 
of an event or outcome E conditional on hypothesis H, written Pr(E|H), is 
also referred to as the likelihood of H, given E, sometimes written L(H;E). 
The term likelihood relates to the hypothesis, though, not the evidence, which 
is why the above expressions ‘likelihood of the evidence’ are ambiguous. To 
further illustrate the distinction, let E denote the event of finding large and 
fresh bloodstains (with a DNA profile corresponding to that of the victim) on 
the jacket of a person of interest (POI), and H the proposition that the POI 
assaulted the victim. It appears fair to assert that the probability of observing 
E, the POI’s jacket showing fresh bloodstains with a DNA profile 
corresponding to the victim, conditional on the POI being the person who 
assaulted the victim (H), is high. Let it be close to 1 for the sake of illustration, 
which is reasonable when the POI is arrested shortly after the assault. Thus, 
the likelihood of H given E, i.e. L(H;E), is high: the proposition H provides 
a good account of the findings E. But that does not mean that Pr(H|E), the 
probability of H (the POI being the offender) conditional on E is high, too. 
Only Pr(E|H) is. To help understand why this is so it is useful to consider that 
there may be other viable alternative propositions that also have a high 
likelihood. Consider, for example, the alternative proposition H' according to 
which the POI is not the offender, but is a good Samaritan who provided first 
aid to the victim. Under this conditional, the probability of the bloodstain 
evidence E may be high as well. That is, Pr(E|H') may also be close to 1. But 
again, this high likelihood of H' does not imply that H' is (highly) probable. 
Indeed, in the example here, the likelihoods of H and H', given E, are both 
high (i.e., close to 1), i.e. they both provide good accounts of the findings E, 
but clearly H and H' cannot be both highly probable (i.e., close to 1) for as 
this would lead to a total probability greater than 1, and hence violate the 
rules of probability. Stated another way, with likelihoods, the evidence is 
fixed, but the propositions vary. Using again the above example, the two 
                                               
36 Supra note 13, at 15. 
37 Supra note 13, at 20. 
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conditional probabilities Pr(E|H) and Pr(E|H') feature the same evidence E 
under different conditionals, H and H', and are two likelihoods. This is 
commonly known among forensic scientists who refer to the ratio of the two 
conditional probabilities Pr(E|H) and Pr(E|H') as the likelihood ratio.38 
Inherent in this notion is that the term likelihood refers to a proposition H 
with respect to E, but not the reverse: i.e., there is no reference to a ‘likelihood 
of the evidence E’. 
More generally, the distinction between the likelihood of the proposition 
given evidence, and the probability of the same proposition conditional on 
the same evidence is important to raise awareness about what is known as the 
“fallacy of the transposed conditional”,39 described also in legal contexts.40 
A fallacious transposing of the conditional occurs, for example, when one 
equates the probability of observing a positive reaction to a diagnostic test if 
a person handled a certain substance (e.g. explosives) and the probability of 
the person having handled said substance if a positive reaction is observed.41 
Our point here is not to claim that the distinction between probability and 
likelihood is a safeguard against fallacious conclusions in general. Indeed, as 
argued by Sullivan, “[t]he difference between these concepts is too foreign 
and too esoteric for mere words to make any difference on their own.”42 
Notwithstanding, it is a general hindrance to both legal research and practice 
if the underlying concepts are not properly distinguished. 
 
C.  Flat earth and moon landing: the myth of ‘true’ probabilities 
There is one more salient topic in the expression “estimated likelihoods 
of the evidence”43. It has to do with the use of the terms ‘estimate’ and 
                                               
38 E.g., Colin Aitken & Franco Taroni, Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for 
Forensic Scientists (2004). Likelihood ratios have a long history in statistical literature where 
they are known as a measure of the value of experimental findings (see, e.g., Irving J. Good, 
Probability and the Weighing of Evidence (1950) at 63). 
39 Persi Diaconis & David Freedman, The Persistence of Cognitive Illusions, 4 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences 333–334 (1981) at 333.   
40 William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence 
in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 Law 
and Human Behavior 167–187 (1987). 
41 For a discussion of this fallacy in the context of the Birmingham Six bombing case, 
see Bernard Robertson & Tony Vignaux, Interpreting Evidence, Evaluating Forensic Science 
in the Courtroom (1995) at 92. For an example in medical diagnosis see e.g. David M. Eddy, 
Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Evidence, Problems and Opportunities, in: Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under Uncertainty, Heuristics 
and Biases, 249–267 (1982) at 254. General guidance is also provided by The Inns of Court 
College of Advocacy & The Royal Statistical Society, Statistics and Probability for 
Advocates: Understanding Statistical Evidence in Courts and Tribunals (2017). 
42 Sean P. Sullivan, A Likelihood Story: The Theory of Legal Fact-Finding, 90 
University of Colorado Law Review 1–66 (2019). 
43 Supra note 15, and similarly in Fenton et al., supra note 26 (“estimating what we call 
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‘estimation’, commonly used in sentences such as “a (...) probability of the 
guilt-hypothesis can be estimated”.44 Indeed, it is common to encounter 
expressions like ‘estimating a probability’ in everyday language, but again, 
complications are in the details, and their conceptual implications are far 
reaching. In this Section, we will point out why probabilities are not the object 
of ‘estimation’. 
Start by considering a situation in which the term ‘estimation’ is useful 
and appropriate: it is the case when there is a real quantity to discover. Take 
the example of the proportion of members in a target population that have a 
particular feature, such as a eye colour. In theory, it is possible to determine 
such a proportion by inspecting every member of the population, though this 
is time and resource consuming.45 It is for this reason that scientists rely on 
the inspection of only a selected number of members of the population, in 
order to draw a conclusion about the population as a whole – in terms of an 
estimate. This bears no relationship, however, with a proposition such as ‘the 
defendant is the offender’.46 This proposition is either true or false. Here, 
probability merely serves as an expression for your (or, anybody’s) 
uncertainty that this proposition is true. This probability can take any value 
between zero and one, but there is no ‘true’ or ‘uniquely/objectively right’ 
probability, i.e. your belief, that could somehow be ‘estimated’. All that can 
be said is that the more you are sure that a given proposition is true, the higher 
your probability (i.e., close to one), and, conversely, the surer you are that the 
proposition is false, the smaller your probability (i.e., close to zero). 
Probability is a very liberal concept47 in that it does not tell one what their 
probability should be (besides that it ought to be a number between zero and 
one). This property raises many concerns among legal and forensic science 
scholars that deserve careful consideration. 
A main concern is that personally-assigned probabilities – commonly 
referred to as subjective probabilities – are prone to “abuse (...) to allow 
people to render opinions (...) on what is sometimes no better than a guess.”48 
                                               
the ‘opportunity prior probability’; the probability that a suspect is guilty”, at 2). 
44 Supra note 13, at 16. 
45 Also, the population would change during the course of inspection through births, 
deaths and migration (Ian W. Evett & Bruce S. Weir, Interpreting DNA Evidence (1998) at 
43).  
46 Note that we avoid the term ‘guilt-hypothesis’ because, as noted above (supra note 
28), guilt is a decision, not a hypothesis. 
47 Dennis V. Lindley, Making Decisions, Second Edition (1985) at 22. 
48 D. Michael Risinger, Reservations About Likelihood Ratios (and Some Other Aspects 
of Forensic ‘Bayesianism’), 12 Law, Probability & Risk 63–73 (2013) at 71. The term 
‘guess’ is also used by Dahlman, supra note 13, who notes that “[d]ecision-makers are on 
their own, making guesses about reference classes” (at 20). 
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Similarly, Allen is concerned about “uncontrolled subjectivity”49 and that 
probabilities “could be any numbers at all, and they need not be constrained 
in any way by the quality of the evidence”.50 Forensic scientists also show 
resistance against assessments “which are directly the result of subjective 
judgement”.51 These are valid concerns with respect to the liberal concept of 
probability and they merit careful attention.  
We have elsewhere critically exposed what we termed “unconstrained 
subjectivism”52, i.e. an arbitrary and speculative use of probability to support 
“fanciful probability statements devoid of any meaningful justification”.53 
This, however, is not how serious personal probabilists understand 
probability.54 In this context, subjective does not mean arbitrary. Subjective 
probabilists invoke particular criteria to constrict arbitrary probability 
assignment. Specifically, there are two related, critically important notions – 
justification and conditioning information – that need to be considered in 
personal probabilities.55  
To illustrate, consider two examples. The first deals with the proposition 
that the earth is flat.56 Suppose that you assign a high probability for this 
proposition to be true. This may seem like a silly example and, at first sight, 
                                               
49 Supra note 6, at 138. 
50 Supra note 5, at 10. Note, however, that even the purest subjective probabilists are not 
dismissive of evidence. For example, de Finetti, supra note 7, requires that our beliefs have 
a “reasonable relationship to any kind of relevant objective data” (at xv). 
51 Geoffrey S. Morrison & Ewald Enzinger, What Should a Forensic Practitioner’s 
Likelihood Ratio Be?, 56 Science & Justice 374–379 (2016) at 374. 
52 Alex Biedermann, Silvia Bozza, Franco Taroni & Colin Aitken, The Meaning of 
Justified Subjectivism and its Role in the Reconciliation of Recent Disagreements Over 
Forensic Probabilism, 57 Science & Justice 477–483 (2017) at 478. 
53 Id. 
54 As noted by Bruno de Finetti, Probability, Induction and Statistics (1972): “We strive 
to make such judgments as dispassionate, reflective and wise as possible (...)” (at 144). 
According to de Finetti, every probability elicitation comes down – in essence – to an 
individualized assessment, thus arguing in favor of “removing the distinction between 
certainty and guessing, which have been identified as fallacious notions” (at 62), and 
opposing to “(...) the artificial distinction between knowing and guessing as distinct 
categories of response” (at 63).  
55 See, e.g., Paolo Garbolino, Explaining Relevance, 22 Cardozo Law Review 1503–
1521 (2001), invoking the notion of “[r]easonable personal probabilities” (at 1504), and 
arguing that “[i]f we cannot require everybody sharing the same likelihoods, we can require 
everybody having justified likelihoods” (at 1506). Interestingly, Swiss criminal law, for 
example, is more demanding: it mandates the evaluation of evidence to be rational, which in 
turn is defined by some legal scholars as being ‘intersubjective’, in the sense that multiple 
judges or courts could agree on the assessment of the evidence that was done in a given case. 
See Jean-Marc Verniory, La libre appréciation de la preuve pénale et ses limites, 118 Revue 
Pénale Suisse (2000), 378–413, at 390–393. 
56 This example is adapted from Lindley (2006), supra note 34, at 13, but we develop it 
further here in order to illustrate more points of discussion. 
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could serve as perfect illustration that probability indeed supports fanciful 
statements. But, as Lindley notes, “there is nothing in our rules [of 
probability] to say you are wrong, merely that you are unusual (...)”.57 This 
leads to several points of reflection. First, we should ask why the assertion of 
a high probability for the proposition that the earth is flat seems inappropriate 
to us. Presumably, it seems inappropriate to us because of the overwhelming 
evidence we have to the contrary.58 So, whenever we encounter a person who 
we think holds strange or unusual beliefs, we should question that person on 
her evidence. It may well be that the knowledge base of that person does not 
contain the same evidence as that available to us, that the person of interest 
may assess available evidence differently, or consider evidence only 
selectively.59 But consider now a variation to this example and imagine a 
person back in ancient times, before the rise of Hellenistic astronomy. Given 
the evidence available at that time, it would not appear unusual to the casual 
observer to believe that the earth is flat: after all, her observations are limited 
to the perspective of a person standing on the earth with her two feet. When 
we judge the appropriateness of such a person’s high probability for the event 
that the earth is flat, we need to keep in mind the conditioning information: 
today’s body of knowledge is different from the one available in ancient 
times. Whatever the person’s views are on the proposition of interest, 
probability is not at fault in any way – rather, it works just fine: it serves as a 
precise expression of what a given person thinks about the truth of a 
proposition of interest. And, in all cases – even when the assertions and 
beliefs seem obviously right – it is worthwhile to inquire about the 
foundations of probability assertions, i.e. how they are justified, and on which 
conditioning information they rely.60 
As a second example, consider the possibility of a manned mission to the 
moon in the near future. What is the probability of the successful arrival of a 
manned spacecraft on the surface of the moon?61 Before addressing this 
question, we might wish to obtain some additional information, such as who 
                                               
57 Supra note 34, at 13. 
58 E.g., the website https://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/images/index.html hosts images 
provided by the NASA. 
59 For example, the person may distrust public sources and governmental agencies, such 
as NASA. 
60 As an aside, note that the flat earth example also shows that probability assignments 
cannot be substantiated with base rate or frequency perspectives: we cannot meaningfully 
conceive of a series of earths and count the number of times the earth was found to be flat 
and spherical, respectively. 
61 As in the previous example, we insist on the fact that there is no base rate to consider 
here. We have to deal with a unique singular, non-repeatable event that is different from 
previous space missions in various respects, such as the features of the spacecraft, the crew 
and the high number of other factors that characterise modern space missions. 
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is planning the mission. Is it an experienced and well-funded entity, such as 
NASA, or a small country, such as Liechtenstein, that has no experience in 
space exploration? Or, is it a private company? This example shows that we 
naturally inquire about the relevant conditioning information when assessing 
a probability, and that we care about this information to be thorough and 
trustworthy, in order for our probability assignment to be justifiable. But 
again, there is no single ‘right’ probability: the information available to an 
engineer involved in said space mission might well be different from the 
information available to the general public. It will not be surprising, thus, that 
the probabilities assigned to the proposition by engineers or members of the 
public will differ: while each opinion may be well justified in its own right, 
the conditioning information between different people will vary.  
However, it may rightly be invoked that probability does not prevent a 
person from declaring a more extreme probability than what this person 
actually considers to be a suitable probability in the case at hand.62,63 It is for 
this reason that the notions of justification and conditioning information are 
powerful notions to help examine whether probability assessors are in 
possession of information that entitles them to their assertions, in law64 as any 
other context of application.  
 
D.  The veil of robustness and endless regress 
Related to the topic of justification of probability assertions are concerns 
about the extent of supporting information. Dahlman notes: “A further 
problem with probability assessments that are based on insufficient reference 
data is that such assessments are ‘un-robust’. That an assessment is un-robust 
means that it is likely that additional reference data would change the 
assessment significantly, and this is not acceptable.”65 These assertions 
confuse different issues.  
First, while available information may vary to any extent, probability 
incorporates as much relevant information as is available. But, if there is 
limited information, this is not a fault or problem of probability, but merely 
reflects an intrinsic condition of the real world.66 Even if one does not endorse 
                                               
62 In later parts of this paper we will expose how the decisional conceptualization of 
probability specifically copes with this challenge. 
63 In forensic science, for example, such overstatements became known as “leap of faith” 
(David A. Stoney, What Made us Ever Think We Could Individualize Using Statistics? 31 
Journal of the Forensic Science Society 197–1999 (1991) at 198). 
64 As noted by Allen (2017), supra note 6, at 137, “the evidentiary process requires 
personal knowledge or justified expert knowledge.” 
65 Supra note 13, at 20. 
66 Conversely, new evidence is also an inherent feature of the real world and is the reason 
why modern legal orders permit appeals, with some systems permitting secondary and 
subsequent appeals. 
24-Jul-19] INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE 17 
 
probabilistic thinking, the issue of imperfect data will persist. The notion of 
justified probability assertion is useful in this context because it is transparent 
regarding its foundations and, thereby, informs discussants about the extent 
to which probabilities rely on data. In any case, decision makers preserve 
their liberty regarding how to act or proceed based on such probabilities.   
Second, probability assessment is bound to systemic conditions, i.e. the 
properties of the context of application. As Allen insists, “[t]he law has to 
decide at the moment in question; it cannot suspend belief while a series of 
tests is conducted to see if anything useful emerges.”67 This leaves decision 
makers with no choice other than to make the best use of whatever relevant 
information is available at the time a decision needs to be made. As noted 
previously, probability is not a magic device that can ‘produce’ information 
out of nothing, it merely serves the purpose of expressing a person’s 
uncertainty as a function of available data, however good or poor that data 
may be. 
Third, invoking other data that might be observed, but that are not, is a 
typical concern of frequentist statistics that postulates that observations could 
conceivably have resulted in another set of data.68 Underlying this concern is 
what Lindley69 calls hindsight, which raises the question of how to look at ex 
ante assessments from an ex post data perspective. For example, it is 
commonly said that when new data suggest or favor propositions other than 
those endorsed ex ante, the previous opinion (or, probability) is incorrect or 
wrong. However, such critiques are misplaced because, by definition, a 
probability is conditioned on the information available at the time when the 
original assessment was made. It is pointless to criticize an assessment based 
on information that was unavailable to the probability assessor ex ante. The 
point of subsequently obtained data is not one of judging probabilities as 
being ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, or making a correction, but one of recognizing that 
a former probability assessment needs readjustment in the light of new 
information, leading to a new probability assignment.70,71  
                                               
67 Allen (2017), supra note 6, at 139, and Allen & Stein (2013), supra note 3, at 601. 
68 We have noted earlier in § A.  why we do not consider events of legal interest to be 
conceivable in terms of repetitions. 
69 Supra note 47, at 192. 
70 See also De Finetti (2017), supra note 7, at 176: “If, on the basis of observations (...) 
one formulates new and different previsions (...) for events whose outcome is unknown, it is 
not a question of a correction. (...) new results (...) enrich one’s state of information, drawing 
out of this the evaluations corresponding to this new state of information. For the person 
making them (You, me, some other individual), these evaluations are as correct now, as were, 
and are, the preceding ones, though of then.” (emphasis as in original) 
71 As an aside, note that this view is also in agreement with foundational principles in 
statistical theory according to which inferences ought to rely exclusively on actually 
observed data, not other data that might have been observed but were not (e.g., James O. 
Berger & Robert L. Wolpert, The Likelihood Principle (1984)). 
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An outgrowth of concerns about the extent to which probabilities are 
supported by data are proposals of interval or second-order72 probabilities. In 
a nutshell, these proposals seek to circumvent the difficulty of asserting a 
probability – as an expression of one’s uncertainty – in terms of a single 
number. Recently, this has led to considerable controversy among forensic 
scientists, with some discussants insisting on the logic of understanding 
probability as a single number,73 and others arguing to the contrary.74 While, 
as per definition, probability is a single number – for different numbers 
express different states of uncertainty – the practical implementation of this 
definition at its full level of rigor may be difficult. However, it is not a viable 
solution then to merely add an additional level of technicality in terms of 
intervals or the like. Indeed, if one is not able to assign a single-valued 
probability in the first place, how is one to assign a probability, or an interval 
(requiring two values, an upper and a lower bound), over a probability? 
According to Lindley, this leads to an infinite regress75 and confuses the 
measuring device (i.e., probability) with its application in practice.76 
 
E.  The struggle with the ‘(non-) knowledge’ of probabilities 
The concerns raised in the previous sections regarding ostensibly true and 
robust probabilities reveal a further question that is often raised in connection 
with the assertion of probabilities, in particular when they are hard to elicit: 
the issue of how one can ‘know’ probabilities, especially knowing which is 
the ‘right’ probability. Indeed, one often hears statements such as ‘I don’t 
                                               
72 See, e.g., supra note 13, at 20: “Robustness can be modelled as a second-order 
probability (...)”. 
73 E.g., Franco Taroni et al., Dismissal of the Illusion of Uncertainty in the Assessment 
of a Likelihood Ratio, 15 Law, Probability & Risk 1–16 (2016), Anders Nordgaard, 
Comment on ‘Dismissal of the Illusion of Uncertainty in the Assessment of a Likelihood 
Ratio’ by Taroni F., Bozza S., Biedermann A., Aitken C., 15 Law, Probability & Risk 17–
22 (2016), Charles Berger & Kas Slooten, The LR Does not Exist, 56 Science & Justice 388–
391 (2016).  
74 For a collection of forensic science articles on the topic see e.g. Geoffrey S. Morrison 
(Ed.), Measuring and Reporting the Precision of Forensic Likelihood Ratios, Virtual Special 
Issue, Science & Justice, www.sciencedirect.com/journal/science-and-justice/special-
issue/102F0FGVD03. The practical impact of these discussions appears to remain limited, 
however, as forensic scientists continue to make debatable assertions about intervals (for a 
recent example see, e.g., Dennis McNevin, Kirsty Wright, Janet Chaseling, Mark Barash, 
Commentary on: Bright et al. (2018) Internal validation of STRmixTM – A multi laboratory 
response to PCAST, Forensic Science International: Genetics, 34: 11–24, 41 Forensic 
Science International: Genetics, e14–e17 (2019)). 
75 “(...) it is nonsense for you to have a belief about your belief if only because to do so 
leads to an infinite regress of beliefs about beliefs about beliefs” (supra note 34, at 115). The 
notion of ‘infinite regression’ has previously been used by Bruno de Finetti, supra note 54, 
at 193. 
76 Supra note 34, at 36. 
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know what the probability is’, where the emphasis on ‘the’ suggests that there 
is a real and uniquely applicable – and hence potentially knowable – 
probability to be discovered. This may occur, for example, when one attempts 
to define and assess probabilities in terms of base rates, but one cannot 
provide or agree on the applicable reference classes, or one lacks suitable 
base rate data. But again, this confuses the assessment of probability with its 
definition. If one can agree on the view that probability is, in a most general 
sense, an observer’s expression of the degree of belief that a particular 
uncertain event is true, depending on the specific information and knowledge 
available to that observer, then assertions of non-knowledge of probabilities 
turn out to be a “pseudo-problem”.77 According to this account, probabilities 
are an observer’s justified position statements regarding events of any kind, 
hence asserting that one does not know one’s probabilities would mean to say 
that one does not know one’s states of mind (i.e., opinions):  
“Among the answers that do not make sense, and cannot be 
admitted, are the following: ‘I do not know,’ ‘I am ignorant of 
what the probability is,’ ‘in my opinion the probability does not 
exist.’ Probability (or prevision) is not something which in itself 
can be known or not known: It exists in that it serves to express, 
in a precise fashion, for each individual, his choice in his given 
state of ignorance.”78  
The challenge, thus, does not rest with the concept of probability, but with 
limitations of one’s commitment to the task of probability elicitation, or with 
external factors that prevent one from asserting probabilities. These factors 
are multiple and possibly interrelated, such as aversion against publicly 
exposing one’s (probabilistic) view, and bearing the responsibility that comes 
with probability assertion. There may also be policy reasons or legal 
obligations that prevent one from the reliance on and exposure of relevant 
information, for example when it is proprietary.  
 
F.  The trap of murky propositions 
Questionable elicitation targets, in the form of highly peculiar 
hypotheticals, are a further source of difficulties in assessing probabilities, 
and are often used in attempts to illustrate the limited suitability of personal 
probabilities. Vermeule, for instance, invoking an example drawn from 
Elster79, argues that questions such as whether “Norway in the year 3000 will 
                                               
77 De Finetti, supra note 54, at 63. At another instance, De Finetti, supra note 7, has 
noted: “Probability is the result of an evaluation; it has no meaning until the evaluation has 
been made and, from then on, it is known to the one who has made it. For this obvious reason 
alone, the phrase ‘unknown probabilities’ is already intrinsically improper (...)” (at 122). 
78 Supra note 7, at 72. 
79 Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change (1983) at 199. 
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be a democracy rather than a dictatorship”80 lead to meaningless 
probabilities, devoid of any epistemic credentials.  
It is true that there is nothing in probability theory that prevents one from 
giving a probability in reply to such a question,81 and it may seem appalling 
that personal probabilists consider it feasible – in principle (though not 
necessarily straightforward) – to give a probability here. However, asserting 
a probability, even for strange propositions, does not found a criticism of 
probability. Sensible subjective probabilists might well invoke that they do 
not wish to declare a probability because of the nature of the question asked 
and the intricacy of the domain of expertise on which they are consulted – 
rendering justified probability assignments for the case at hand too 
challenging.  
Thus, the difficulty relies in the real-world problem under study, not with 
the chosen analytical framework of thinking. As noted by Friedman, 
probability “(...) is a flexible template. It can take into account as much 
complexity as its user is able to handle”,82 and, to which we can add, that the 
user is willing and feels able to defend. What is more, Friedman argues,83 the 
theory would indeed have limited value, and lack comprehensiveness, if it 
did not – in principle – allow us to contemplate any real-world proposition, 
however peculiar and difficult to assess it may be. In this sense, there is 
nothing inherently wrong with asserting a personal probability for the 
‘Norway proposition’ as long as all the discussants are clear about the 
idiosyncrasy of the elicitation target (i.e., an event in the far future) and the 
limitations in the available knowledge and expertise required to appropriately 
address the question under scrutiny. As an aside, it is also clear that resorting 
to other types of probability, such as frequentist or base rate inspired 
interpretations, would not be an option. Among the remaining alternatives 
would be not to opine on the question of interest, though we have mentioned 
previously that in legal contexts, fact-finders do not have the liberty to delay 
action.  
 
G.  Intermediate summary: from abstract definitions to probability as a 
decision 
The above sections have raised and discussed a number of recurrent, but 
by no means exhaustive, criticisms of probability. The objections we have 
reviewed appear to be influenced by a frequentist definition of probability. 
We have seen that attempts to apply this definition of probability runs into 
                                               
80 Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty, An Institutional Theory of Legal 
Interpretation (2006) at 173. 
81 A similar comment has been made previously in §1.C. about the flat earth example. 
82 Supra note 24, at 288. 
83 Id. 
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operational difficulties. These range from the definition and availability of 
relevant data for a case at hand to conflicts with principles and values of the 
legal process. Specifically, we have identified as one source of difficulty the 
fact that classic (i.e., frequentist) pursuits of probability conflate the 
definition of probability with its assignment. This has led us to provisionally 
favour the counter-position according to which probability is a person’s 
individual assessment of uncertainty regarding any event, conditioned on 
whatever data and knowledge is available to this person at the time 
uncertainty is (probabilistically) quantified.  
This interpretation of probability as belief is neither a new or an original 
standpoint, nor is it free from attracting its own objections. Among the chief 
objections is the concern that the liberal concept of probability which, in a 
strict sense, places only limited constraints on probability assertions (i.e., 
coherence requirements), can induce people to assert any probabilities they 
wish, without any epistemic warrants. In §I.C.  we argued that such 
unconstrained probabilism, albeit a valid concern, does not correspond to 
how serious probabilists understand personal probability. They consider that 
the liberal concept of probability comes at the price of responsibility that must 
be assumed.  
In the remaining parts of this paper, we shall illustrate how an individual’s 
sense for responsible probability assertion can formally be incentivised. We 
will do so by relying on a particular concept, to be explained in due course, 
which mirrors probability through the way in which a given individual is 
prepared to act under uncertainty, given their best knowledge. The rationale 
for this methodological choice derives from an analogy with the burden of 
decision at other instances of the legal process. Conclusions regarding 
ultimate issues, for example, are – by their nature – questions of decision 
which ought to be argumentatively well grounded. Similarly, we will argue, 
one can interpret the sensible assertion of a probability regarding an 
intermediate uncertain proposition as a decision. That is, an individual 
decides which probability to assert in any given instance, by making the best 
use of the entirety of the available knowledge and information, and by aiming 
to appraise reality as defensibly as possible. 
 
PART 2: THE DECISIONALIZATION OF PROBABILITY 
A.  The possibility of measuring uncertainty using a standard 
Unlike accounts that seek to conceptualise probability in terms of abstract 
and impersonal notions (e.g., secondary concepts such as reference classes, 
base rates, etc.), we shall start the presentation of the decisional perspective 
of probability by placing the individual in the centre of our analysis. This 
does not deny the view that factfinders ought to be disinterested individuals, 
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and the court be “a disinterested forum”,84 instructed to pursue legal 
proceedings as “the disinterested application of common sense”85 including 
“all the necessary forms–deductive, inductive, abductive statistical–as 
necessary or appropriate”.86 The point of interest here is the uncontested fact 
that all legal trials place decision-making at their centre, an activity that is 
fundamentally directed by individuals, mandated to implement societal 
values. The choice of an analytical framework should thus properly account 
for this reality. The person-centric approach precisely characterises this view 
“(...) for it describes a real situation of a subject, or observer, contemplating 
a world, rather than talking about a world divorced from the observers living 
in it, as do some sciences.”87 
However, before we proceed with exposing the decisional perspective to 
probability, it is necessary to address one more intricacy. It deals with the 
question of whether, and if so, how, appraisals of uncertainty can be given a 
clear, firm and measurable structure – an aim that the proclaimed 
objectivistic approaches based on single notions, such as base rates, attempt 
to do. Because, for a concept to be tractable and scientifically sound, one 
should be able to measure it, using numbers – at least conceptually.88  
The property of measurability is based on the feasibility of comparisons, 
a notion that is commonly known and recognised by many cognitive 
concepts, beyond probability. For example, the relative plausibility account 
involves qualitative assessments such as “(...) the common sense judgement 
that some explanations are on occasion considerably better, not just better, 
than others”89. Similarly, probabilists make comparative statements of the 
kind ‘I am less sure that event A holds rather than event B’, where A and B 
are propositions about which the individual has incomplete knowledge, and 
where the degree of belief in the truth of each event may be expressed by a 
number between 0 and 1, i.e. the person’s probabilities. But how do we get 
to the understanding that the admissible numbers for probabilities lie in the 
range between 0 and 1, and how do we get to consider these numbers as our 
                                               
84 Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, 13 Law, Probability and Risk 195–219 (2014) at 
196.  
85 Ronald J. Allen, A Note to My Philosophical Friends About Expertise and Legal 
Systems, 28 Humana.Mente Jounral of Philosophical Studies 71–86 (2015) at 79. 
86 Id. at 79. 
87 Lindley, supra note 47, at 20. 
88 Lindley, supra note 47, for example, favors a numerical approach to uncertainty 
because “(...) number is the essence of the scientific method and it is by measuring things 
that we know them” (at 13). The idea of measurability has parallels to the notion of 
operational definitions developed in other fields, such as physics (see, e.g., Percy Bridgman, 
The Logic of Modern Physics, 1927, and Frank Lad, Operational Statistical Methods: A 
Mathematical, Philosophical, and Historical Introduction, 1996).   
89 Supra note 84, at 218. 
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expression of uncertainty? There are various ways to arrive at this result, but 
we shall mention here only one way, mainly because it uses only minimal 
assumptions and technicalities. This should minimize the potential for 
objections and make the presentation accessible for a general audience. The 
argument is due to Lindley90 and relies on our ability to compare uncertain 
events, as mentioned above. But rather than just comparing any two events, 
and assert which of the two compared events is endowed with more or less 
uncertainty than the other, Lindley introduces the idea of a comparison with 
a standard. That is, in order to measure our uncertainty regarding a given 
event (the measurand) numerically, a comparison is to be made against a 
standard. The standard is set up carefully such that its properties should be 
agreed by every reasonable person.91 The conceptual standard introduced by 
Lindley is a container with a proportion p of black balls, and the ‘standard’ 
event is the observation of a black ball after a single draw.92 Clearly, if all the 
balls in the container are black (and hence the proportion p is 1), we will be 
sure to observe a black ball: there will be no uncertainty about this 
observation. Similarly, if the proportion p of black balls is zero, we will be 
certain not to observe a black ball after a single draw. It is now obvious that 
our uncertainty regarding the ball being drawn to be black is closely related 
to the proportion p of black balls in the container, which can be adjusted to 
any number between 0 and 1. Note also that the standard can be defined in a 
more or less finely graded way, depending on the total number of balls: a 
container with 100 balls allows uncertainty to be expressed in 1% increments, 
whereas an urn with 1000 balls allows uncertainty to be expressed in 
increments of 0.01%, and so on.  
We can now use this standard for measuring our uncertainty about any 
event of interest by asking ourselves how our uncertainty about the uncertain 
event, the measurand, compares to the uncertainty of drawing a black ball 
from the container – our standard.93 Clearly, the answer depends on the 
proportion p of black balls. In particular, there must be a proportion p such 
                                               
90 Supra note 47, 17–20. 
91 Note that the idea underlying this procedure is analogous to the one used for the 
measurement of physical quantities, that is by comparing the measurand against some 
standard unit. 
92 Note that the ball is only to be drawn once, and the observation of a black ball is solely 
determined by the proportion p of black balls. There is no notion of relative frequency 
involved here. As noted forcefully by Lindley, supra note 34, the “(...) long-run frequency 
(...) in repeated drawings is irrelevant. After its withdrawal, the urn and its contents can go 
up in smoke for all that it matters” (at 36).  
93 Our presentation here is simplified in the sense that it does not mention Lindley’s 
device of considering the comparison in terms of a choice between two options (with not 
stake involved): receiving a small prize if the target event is true and to receive the same 
prize if the ball from the container turns out to be black. 
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that our uncertainty about the target event to be measured is the same as our 
uncertainty regarding the drawing of a black ball from the container. Once 
determined, this point of equivalence, as given by the proportion p, is then 
said to be our probability for the uncertain event.94  
To be clear, the suggestion here is not that we carry an urn with us to 
conduct a probability elicitation whenever we need one.95,96 The comparison 
is only to be contemplated. The sole purpose is to provide a way to explain, 
in principle, the nature and the form of probability assessments, using only 
most basic ingredients – free of any difficulties arising from mainstream 
(relative) frequency ideas. We do not deny that – despite its simplicity – the 
procedure of comparison with a standard may be difficult to apply, even 
conceptually. Indeed, critical observers might say that there is nothing in the 
procedure to prevent aleatory and fanciful assertions of equivalence points 
and, worse, that there is no guidance to help one find out when exactly one 
has reached a point of equivalence, however well-intentioned and committed 
one may be in the application of the procedure.  
These objections have to do with unconstrained subjectivism, a problem 
that we addressed in §I.C.  Probability being a liberal concept, it requires 
scrutiny and challenge in its application. We will provide further means to 
address this issue in the next section. The objection regarding the difficulty 
of measuring uncertainty probabilistically is a valid one, though it is 
important to be precise about where exactly the difficulty lies. As argued in 
§I.F.  the difficulty is not due to the measurement procedure, which is an 
extremely simple one, but to the complexity of the measurand, that is the real-
world event under consideration.  
A further objection that may be raised concerns the relationship with 
evidence. As the attentive reader may have observed, the above definition of 
probability does not explicitly mention evidence and data. It is tempting, thus, 
                                               
94 The balls in the urn should not be misunderstood as a representation of a collection of 
real-world cases. The urn’s sole purpose is to serve as a device for conceptualizing an event 
with a well-defined probability; it is this uncertain event which is then to be compared to the 
real-world event (or, proposition) of interest – the measurand – but which could be any, and 
has no relationship with a ball in an urn.  
95 The measurement procedure using a standard is not entirely theoretical, however, as 
some researchers have successfully used it to elicit probabilities in experiments with 
prospective jurors (see, e.g., Nicholas Scurich, Kenneth D. Nguyen & Richard S. John, 
Quantifying the Presumption of Innocence, 15 Law, Probability & Risk 71–86 (2016)). 
96 Interestingly, practicing lawyers facing strategic decisions more openly embrace 
conceptual devices for probability elicitation. For a method comparable to the urn scheme, 
but based on a betting (or, probability) wheel with colored segments of varying size, 
reflecting the ‘chance of winning’, see e.g. Howell E. Jackson, Louis Kaplow, Steven M. 
Shavell, W. Kip Viscusi & David Cope, Analytical Methods for Lawyers (2003), at 28. More 
detailed expositions can also be found, e.g., in Detlof von Winterfeldt & Ward Edwards, 
Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research (1986), at 117. 
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to interpret this as yet another argument in support of the view that personal 
probabilities lack proper evidentiary bases. However, this reproach is 
misplaced because, as we have clarified at the outset, we are making a 
distinction between the definition of probability and its evaluation. The above 
definition – in terms of the conceptual application of a standard – only serves 
to express the idea of measuring uncertainty through probability. It is 
assumed that personal probability assignments thus made will take into 
account any relevant data there may be. This, however, is a question of how 
to evaluate probabilities in particular instances, and there are formal 
procedures available for this task.97 
It is legitimate to ask whether these are satisfactory answers that make 
subjective probability any better and more viable than classic (e.g., 
frequentist) accounts. Specifically, a key concern that remains – relevant for 
any conceptualization of probability – is the question of how ‘good’ a given 
probability assignment is, and how one can give incentives so that probability 
assessors give undistorted, non-exaggerated and non-aleatory probability 
assignments. The decisionalist perspective to probability, presented in the 
next section, precisely addresses this point. 
 
B.  Understanding probability assertions as decisions 
Inherent in the understanding of probability as a person’s expression of 
their degree of belief that a certain proposition is true, is the avoidance of 
deference to abstract notions (e.g., relative frequencies and base rates) that 
attempt to attribute to probabilities any sort of existence independent of the 
person who evaluates them. As we have seen, many scholars in law and other 
fields interested in probability have repeatedly exposed problems arising 
from said notions. While, technically, we agree with the impasses they 
expose, we disagree with their conclusion that probability, especially 
personal probability, is an inadequate concept; such a conclusion is 
tantamount to throw up one’s hands at the price of making assessments at all. 
As we see them, the criticisms arise from unfruitful attempts of using single 
notions for both, the definition of probabilities in general, and their 
evaluation in actual instances of application. The interpretation of probability 
as measures of degrees of belief, as exposed in the previous section, 
effectively avoids such complications.98 The question we address now is, 
given the understanding of probability being defined as a person’s degree of 
belief, how can we conceive of a way to encourage individuals to make 
probability assignments in a serious and well reflected way.  
One possibility consists in appealing to a person’s responsibility for their 
                                               
97 See also supra note 35. 
98 Maria C. Galavotti, Who is Afraid of Subjective Probability? in: C. de Florio & A. 
Giordani (Eds.), From Arithmetic to Metaphysics (2018), 151–157. 
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probability assignments by insisting on the view that the assertion of a 
probability actually amounts to making a decision – a decision that ought to 
be ‘well done’, in some sense. To clarify this idea, the probabilist Bruno de 
Finetti emphasized the idea of scoring: the person who indicates her 
probabilities shall do so by keeping in mind that she will incur a penalty (or, 
score) based on the number (i.e., probability) that she has reported. The 
scoring method – in literature known as a scoring rule – is designed in such 
a way that it is in the person’s interest to state the probability that corresponds 
to her actual degree of belief. Stated otherwise, under this kind of scoring 
rule,99 the person can, by following the precept of providing sincere 
probability assertions, minimize the expectation of the penalty.  In a nutshell, 
the score – we choose here the quadratic score as an example100 – works as 
follows: for an event E, which may be either true or false, represented by the 
numbers 1 and 0, respectively, the asserted probability a for event E receives 
the score (1-a)2 if the event E turns out to be true, and a2 if the event E turns 
out to be false. The score thus amounts to the squared difference101 between 
the asserted value a and the truth-values 1 and 0.  
It might be objected at this point that the design of the scoring rule is of 
limited use for applications in the law because ground truths are typically 
unavailable in this context. However, as will be explained later in this section, 
actual ground truths are not needed, only (personal) probabilities for states of 
nature. These will be used to compute so-called probability-weighted scores, 
which in turn represent the core of the scoring rule argument. 
Before approaching these details, start by considering the following more 
general properties of this scoring regime and their implications for probability 
utterances: 
• Broadly speaking, we would say that one’s thought, expressed in terms 
of probability, is ‘good’ if it lies in the direction of truth.102 As may be 
seen, the quadratic score leads to smaller penalties the closer one’s 
asserted probability is to 1 and 0 for events that are, respectively, true and 
                                               
99 Rules with this property are called proper scoring rules. Other scoring rules exist, but 
they may not guarantee that stating one’s probability sincerely is the optimal decision (i.e., 
will minimize the expected score). 
100 For other examples of proper scoring rules, such as the logarithmic scoring rule, see 
e.g. Giovanni Parmigiani & Lurdes Inoue, Decision Theory, Principles and Approaches 
(2009) at 195. 
101 Note that taking the simple difference, rather than the squared difference, would not 
be a proper scoring rule (i.e., under such a rule, honest reporting of probabilities does not 
minimize the expected score). 
102 Note that here ‘truth’ refers only to the realization of the event E which is unknown 
to the external observer. We are not talking about or suggesting the existence of a true (but 
unknown) probability. 
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false.103  
• The quadratic score discourages extreme probability assertions that go 
beyond the available evidence. Generally, having incomplete knowledge 
about the truth or falsity of an event of interest means that one’s 
probability ought to be different from 1 and 0, respectively. If, 
nevertheless, one decides to make extreme probability assertions, the 
quadratic score will lead to maximum penalties if the event of interest 
does not turn out in the direction that one thought: for example, if one 
asserts probability a=1, but the event of interest is false, then the 
maximum penalty of 1 (i.e., a2) is obtained. If one would have been more 
cautious, say assert a=0.8 instead of a=1, then the penalty would be only 
0.82=0.64 if the event turns out to be false. Analogously, the penalty 
would also be 1 if one asserts a=0 when in fact the event of interest is 
true. Here, too, a more cautious assessment, such as a=0.2, would lead to 
a smaller score, i.e. (1-0.2)2=0.64. 
• A recurrent critique of subjective probability is that it tolerates ‘random’ 
probability assertions, so-called guesses, regardless of consideration 
given to where the actual truth lies. Under the quadratic scoring rule, 
however, such a decision behaviour (i.e., random guessing) is not 
recommended, for the following reason. Suppose that one randomly 
states either probability a=1 or a=0, leading to the maximal penalty of 1 
if one’s assertion does not correspond to the truth-value of event E. Then, 
in a series of n distinct probability assertions (i.e., for distinct events), if 
one gets it ‘right’ (i.e., assert a=1 if E is true, and a=0 if E is false) half 
of the time, the score incurred will be n/2. Now, compare this result with 
the score incurred by a person who is more prudent and prefers not to take 
sides in one way or another, and hence assert probability a=0.5 in each 
case. This means that for each probability assertion, whether the event of 
interest turns out to be true or false, the score incurred will be 0.52=0.25. 
In a series of n probability assertions, the overall score will thus be n/4, 
which is smaller than that of the ‘random guessing’ strategy. Hence, 
subjective probability assertions are not ‘anything goes’ exercises, but 
can be improved with careful reflection. 
We have not seen, so far, how the above ideas favour sincere probability 
assertions. As an illustration, consider the example of tossing an unbiased 
coin. To be clear, coin tossing is clearly not of interest in legal proceedings. 
It is used here solely to ensure that there is no ambiguity about the uncertain 
event to be assessed (i.e., whether the outcome of the single toss is head or 
tails), so that attention can be directed to the nature of probability and its 
                                               
103 Indeed, for a probability assertion of a=1, the penalty would be 0 if the event E is in 
fact true (analogously for a probability assertion of a=0 for an event E that is false). 
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conceptualisation through scoring rules. More realistic illustrations will be 
mentioned later.  
We discuss two aspects in turn: first, the meaning of an asserted 
probability resulting from the measurement against a standard (following 
arguments presented in §2.B.  and second, consideration of the asserted 
probability under the quadratic scoring rule.  
Regarding the first aspect, it is widely accepted that the probability for 
the outcome heads (or tails) after tossing an unbiased coin is 0.5,104 because 
the way in which the tossing experiment is conducted gives us no reason to 
consider that one outcome will be favoured over the other. It is worth noting 
that this information – knowledge about the tossing mechanism at work and, 
possibly, knowledge about the outcomes of past tosses – is evidence, actually. 
It is one source of information for justifying a probability assertion of 0.5. 
Specifically, asserting that our uncertainty about the outcome of a toss turning 
out heads (or tails) is measured by a probability of 0.5 means that we hold the 
same uncertainty for the event of drawing a black ball from an urn that 
contains the proportion p=0.5 of black balls.  
Having seen that our degree of belief about the outcome of the single coin 
toss is 0.5, we now turn to the second aspect, i.e. how to provide an incentive 
so that the asserted probability in fact corresponds to the actual probability of 
0.5 we have in our mind. It is here that the scoring rule scheme intervenes. 
The question thus is, looking at the full range of possible probability 
assertions (i.e., the values between 0 and 1), how can we motivate the person 
to state 0.5, rather than a value other than the one she bears in mind (i.e., 0.5)? 
The point is that under a proper scoring rule, the decision to state 0.5 is 
optimal in the sense that it is the decision which minimises the expected 
score. The expected score is computed in two steps. First, if the coin falls on 
heads (i.e., the event E is true), our statement of probability 0.5 will lead to 
the loss (1-0.5)2=0.25. The probability of incurring this loss is 0.5, i.e. our 
probability for the event E.105 Therefore, we have 0.5x0.25=0.125 as the first 
part of the computation of the expected score. Second, if the coin falls on tails 
(i.e., event E is false), our statement of 0.5 will also lead to a loss of 0.52=0.25. 
Again, this loss will be incurred with probability 0.5, the probability of event 
E being false. Thus, we have a second term 0.5x0.25=0.125 which contributes 
to the expected score. These two components combine by addition to give the 
expected score of stating 0.5, written ES(0.5): 
                                               
104 Note that we are only contemplating the outcome of a single toss here. We are not 
considering the relative frequency of heads or tails in a long series of repeated tosses. 
105 The important point at this juncture is that it is not necessary to know the ground 
truth in order for the scoring rule to be useful. The ground truth is only contemplated to 
define the score. It is to be multiplied by one’s probability for the event of interest (here E). 
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ES(0.5)=0.5x(1-0.5)2+0.5x0.52=0.25.  (1) 
The general formula for the expected score (ES) for an asserted 
probability a is  
ES(a)=Pr(E)x(1-a)2+Pr(not-E)x(a)2,  (2) 
where Pr(E) is our personal (genuine) probability (i.e., degree of belief) for 
the event E, as defined above, depending on our knowledge, understanding 
and any relevant evidence available at the time our assessment is made. Note 
that the use of one’s probabilities for the events E and not-E shows that actual 
ground truths are not necessary.106 The core of the argument is the use of the 
probabilities for the events E and not-E to compute the expected score which 
serves as a measure to compare different belief statements a. In particular, 
note that the optimal probability a to be reported, i.e. the value a that 
minimises the expected score (Eq. (2)), is the one that corresponds to Pr(E). 
Let us provide some further illustration of this fundamental property of 
the quadratic scoring rule by showing that asserted values a different from 
Pr(E)=0.5 lead to higher expected scores, and hence are not optimal 
decisions. Consider the assertions of, for example, a=0.3 and a=0.8. Using 




To provide a complete picture, we can plot the expected score for all 
possible probability assertions a, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
                                               
106 See also supra note 105. 
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Figure 1: Representation of the expected score (ES) as a function of the asserted 
probability a when the probability for the event of interest, E, is Pr(E)=0.5. The optimal 
decision is to report the probability a that corresponds to one’s probability Pr(E). All 
decisions to assert probabilities a different from 0.5 have higher expected scores. 
Examples (using dashed lines) are given for decisions to report a=0.3 and a=0.8, leading 
to expected scores of 0.29 and 0.34, respectively. 
 
Note further that the principle that it is optimal to assert the probability a 
that corresponds to one’s probability Pr(E) is valid for any probability, not 
just for the case of Pr(E)=0.5 considered in the example above. We can 
illustrate this graphically as shown in Figure 2. The x-axis in this figure 
represents the range of different degrees of belief, Pr(E), that one may have, 
in the range from 0 to 1. For each of these degrees of belief, there is exactly 
one asserted probability a that is optimal, i.e. a=Pr(E). Consider, for 
example, the decision to report probability a=1. The straight line from the 
left top corner to the bottom right corner shows the expected score for this 
decision as a function of one’s actual belief state, Pr(E). Clearly, if one’s 
belief is Pr(E)=0, the decision to report a=1 has the highest expected score 
and, thus, will be the worst decision to make. All decisions to report values 
a<1 have a smaller expected score. The decision to report a=1 is the best 
decision only if Pr(E)=1. In the latter case, the expected score is 0, and there 
is no other decision (i.e., report of a value a<1) that has a smaller expected 
score. More generally, we can plot the expected scores for any decision a – 
in Figure 2 examples are given for vales a={0,0.2,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.8,1} – to 
show that a reported probability a is optimal (i.e., has the minimal expected 
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reporting sincerely one’s probability is always optimal.107  
 
Figure 2: Representation of the expected score (ES) for different decisions (i.e., reported 
probabilities a), as a function of one’s actual degree of belief, Pr(E), calculated according 
to equation (2). Examples are given for values a={0,0.2,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.8,1}, showing that 
reporting a value a is optimal – i.e. minimises the expected score – when the reported 
value a corresponds to one’s actual degree of belief Pr(E). 
 
C.  Discussion of the decisionalist perspective to probability 
At the outset, let us insist on the point that in the legal context, the scoring 
rule scheme is not a way to audit a probability assessor (e.g., an expert who 
reports a probability) in actual cases. Instead, it is an analytical argument that 
serves as a way to understand why genuine probability reporting is optimal. 
More generally, the scoring scheme illustrates the feasibility of conceiving 
incentives108 to encourage people to assert personal probabilities honestly. 
                                               
107 For a representation with values a in 0.1 steps see, for example, de Finetti (2017), 
supra note 7, at 160. 
108 The idea of the scheme serving as an incentive may be challenged on the ground that 
people may not adhere, consciously or not, to the ideal of making up their mind carefully 
and reporting genuinely evidence-based scientific opinions. To the extent that this may occur 
in current legal practice, our analyses in this paper will rest on an idealistic starting point. As 
de Finetti has noted, “[it] is of course necessary to distinguish, above all, those people who 
are aware of the mechanism [i.e., the scoring rule] and the spirit of the device and who try to 
use it correctly to express their own beliefs from those who prefer, owing to a lack of right 
understanding or of willingness, to behave as gamblers, for example, by trying to attain the 
maximum of the scores by giving 100 per cent. to the most probable case. The latter must be 
studied separately, as a pathological class.” (Bruno de Finetti, Does it Makes Sense to Speak 













































32 DECISION IN EVIDENCE AND PROOF [24-Jul-19 
 
Under the presented scheme, its neither advisable to distort numbers, in one 
direction or another, from one’s actual degree of belief, nor is it advisable to 
declare probabilities in a random way (i.e., by careless guessing). These 
insights should help tame critiques109 that label subjective probabilities as 
aleatory concepts that are not tailored in any way to available evidence. 
Indeed, without a device such as a proper scoring rule, there is nothing in the 
rules of probability that – strictly speaking – would forbid us to assert any 
probability, in the sense of a ‘random guess’. Insofar, concerns about the 
‘seriousness’ of personal probability assertions are legitimate and deserve 
careful consideration. 
But despite the thorough properties of scoring rules, critics may argue that 
the idea of scoring is of little practical value because one does not ‘know’, in 
the first place, what one’s probability is (i.e., what probability one has in 
mind). In particular, so the objection, there is nothing to be contemplated 
about in terms of an ‘optimal’ probability a, to serve as a reported value, 
since there is no underlying degree of belief Pr(E) available against which a 
could be evaluated. This is a subtle observation for which different replies 
can be offered. First, it is important to note that the difficulty raised does not 
relate to the discussed scoring scheme, but refers to the difficulty of 
probability assignment in the first place. As we have noted repeatedly 
throughout this paper, this is a general difficulty that is not specific to 
subjective probability, but to any interpretation of probability – for as if there 
is any data and knowledge available, the subjectivist perspective will, as any 
other interpretation of probability, strive to use these data sources as suitably 
as possible. Second, the issue is not one of ‘knowing’ or not (one’s) 
probability; in the subjectivist’s perspective one knows, as per definition, 
one’s probability, for it would not make sense to say that one does not know 
one’s state of mind.110 The question is if one is prepared to undertake the 
burden of pinning one’s probability down,111 at least in terms of an order of 
magnitude, and provide a justification for it; else the matter might better not 
be debated at all, at the price of offering no assessment at all. 
But still, critics may say that given the number of occasions and the 
                                               
(Eds.), The Scientist Speculates: An Anthology of Partly-Baked Ideas (1962), 357–364, at 
352). 
109 See, for example, supra notes 48, 49 and 50. 
110 See also discussion presented in §I.E.   
111 Skeptical readers may say that this is not a problem, for example, in the field of 
forensic science where examiners tend to be happy to state their probability, especially 
extreme values of 1 and 0 despite the fact that the issue of interest is not one of certainty and 
impossibility, but marked by uncertainty. However, the deeper problem here may be a lack 
of scientific integrity (see also supra note 108) or a misunderstanding of what it means to 
have incomplete information that, by definition, is insufficient to warrant a categorical 
conclusion. Further discussion of this point is presented later in this section. 
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variety of cases where it is difficult to make up one’s mind, the practical 
relevance of the scoring rule scheme is limited. This objection is formulated 
from a strongly applied perspective, and is similar to objections levelled 
against the measurement of probability using a standard. Clearly, as much as 
we do not suggest to carry out the measurement of uncertainty against a real, 
physical urn, we do not suggest that probability assessors compute expected 
scores. What is important, however, is the use of these ideas as conceptual 
devices. As regards the scoring scheme, it serves the purpose of clarifying 
that, ultimately, the task of asserting a probability comes down to a decision: 
the person must decide which value is the most defensible figure, given the 
best knowledge available to that person at the time when the probability 
assertion is made. This is not to say that the person shall not invoke symmetry 
considerations112 or summaries of relevant data (such as relative 
frequencies113) to inform her probability assignment.114 The point of the 
scoring scheme is to avoid that people defer to abstract and seemingly 
impersonal definitions of probability and, by doing so, think that they hold 
no responsibility for their probability assertions, especially in cases where 
their assessments would be found problematic or otherwise dubious. 
Historically, the quadratic scoring rule is known in meteorology as the 
Brier score115 and has been widely studied since around the 1970s, but it is 
also very relevant for experts consulted in legal proceedings. Forensic science 
experts, for example, are regularly called on to inform a fact-finder about the 
probability of observing particular features in recovered material or marks 
(e.g., the DNA profile of a crime stain, or a configuration of ridge skin 
characteristics in a fingermark) under the assumption that the material or 
mark comes from an unknown person, different from the person of interest 
charged by the prosecution. For single donor DNA profiles that are (nearly) 
complete, and good quality fingermarks, such probabilities can be extremely 
low, to the point that some experts are tempted to report that it is impossible 
                                               
112 Broadly speaking, symmetry judgments refer to situations in which one has no reason 
to prefer one outcome to another. Such judgments may be based on past experience (e.g., 
multiple observations of a given phenomenon) or one’s knowledge about a particular 
physical process at work. 
113 Note, again, that we do not consider here relative frequency as an admissible 
definition of probability, but only as a summary of data suitable to inform a probability 
assignment (see also §I.A.  ). 
114 This includes considerations from probability definitions that, throughout this paper, 
we have identified as being deficient in various respects. Most interestingly, even de Finetti 
(2017), supra note 25, as a declared subjectivist, was not entirely dismissive of probability 
definitions that he did not consider sound: “(...) definitions of ‘objective’ probability, 
although useless per se, turn out to be useful and good as valid auxiliary devices when 
included as such in the subjectivistic theory.” (at xvi) 
115 Glenn W. Brier, Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability, 75 
Monthly Weather Review 1–3 (1950). 
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(i.e., probability of zero) to observe the evidential features in a person other 
than the person of interest – thus suggesting (overwhelmingly) strong support 
for the prosecution’s proposition. However, asserting that the probability of 
seeing the evidential features in the event that an unknown person is the 
source is zero is both empirically unfounded and rationally unsound; it is a 
statement that goes beyond the available evidence.116 Empirically, the 
statement is unfounded because the experts do not usually demonstrate that 
all other potential sources are in fact excluded, except in some atypical 
closed-set situations. And even if they presented evidence of comparisons 
with persons other than the person of interest, the factual accuracy of each 
individual comparison would hinge on probabilities of error not equal to zero 
(as human comparative examinations are known not to be error-free).117 
Hence, an expert’s personal probability cannot be zero, and rounding it off to 
zero would, under a proper scoring rule, not be an optimal value to report. 
The scoring rule scheme thus is one way of showing experts why they should 
not distort probabilities away from their actual degree of belief.118 Note that 
the probability assignment task here is a general one, encountered also with 
other types of evidence.  
A further area of expert evidence where scientists should avoid the 
reporting of categorical opinions (i.e., certainty statements) involves DNA 
mixtures, i.e. traces that contain genetic material from more than one person. 
Based on the number of characteristics seen in the DNA mixture profile, 
some scientists seek to infer the number of persons who have contributed 
material to the mixed stain. Invoking ad-hoc criteria, such as the maximum 
allele count method, they make assertions about the minimum number of 
persons necessary to produce the set of characteristics seen in the trace. 
However, as real-life cases have shown, categorical statements about the 
number of contributors can lead to paradoxical results,119 such as a particular 
person of interest being considered excluded or non-excluded as a potential 
contributor to a mixed stain, depending on the assumed number of 
contributors. One of the sources of such complications is the categorical 
assertion of a number (of contributors) that, in reality, is not and cannot be 
                                               
116 In a seminal paper, Stoney has called this a “leap of faith” (David A. Stoney, What 
Made us Ever Think we Could Individualize Using Statistics? 31 Journal of the Forensic 
Science Society 197–199 (1991), at 198). 
117 Alex Biedermann & Joëlle Vuille, Understanding the Logic of Forensic Identification 
Decisions (without numbers), sui-generis 397–413 (2018), https://doi.org/10.21257/sg.83. 
118 Alex Biedermann, Paolo Garbolino & Franco Taroni, The Subjectivist Interpretation 
of Probability and the Problem of Individualization in Forensic Science, 53 Science & Justice 
192–200 (2013). 
119 See, e.g., Alex Biedermann, Franco Taroni & William C. Thompson, Using 
Graphical Probability Analysis (Bayes Nets) to Evaluate a Conditional DNA Inclusion, 10 
Law, Probability & Risk 89–121 (2011). 
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known with certainty. A scientifically more honest report should 
acknowledge uncertainty and express it in terms of probability. In this 
context, a scoring rule helps to show that – conceptually – it is preferable to 
assign probabilities to different possible numbers of contributors, rather than 
assigning a probability of 1 to only one particular number of contributors (and 
zero to all other possible contributors). Further, probabilistic reporting not 
only avoids paradoxical results of the kind mentioned above, it can also 
empirically be shown – in terms of incurred scores over multiple assessments 
– to be superior to certainty statements (i.e., a categorical reporting 
format).120  
Of course, the crucial question that remains is whether scientists are able 
to provide justified probability assignments for the situation at hand 
supported, ideally, by relevant data.121 We entirely agree with this call for 
challenging assigned probabilities, as outlined in §I.C.  but this aspect is not 
covered by scoring rules122 – these only seek to encourage the honest 
reporting of probabilities within the scope of what is argumentatively 
defensible. Again, either one is prepared to address the burden of 
justification, and assume responsibility for any assigned value, or else no 
opinion should be offered. 
 
D.  Objectivism versus objectivity in subjectivism: “Nothing is lost what 
was a mere illusion”123 
Our argument throughout this paper has been that there is no way for any 
person asserting a probability to avoid taking a personal stance. All attempts 
to conceive of some sort of ‘objective’ probability, independent of the person 
uttering a probability, are bound to fail because, by necessity, adopting a 
criterion or definition requires itself, at some point, a personal choice124 – or 
                                               
120 For a demonstration using simulated DNA mixtures with known numbers of 
contributors see, e.g., Alex Biedermann et al., Inference About the Number of Contributors 
to a DNA Mixture: Comparative Analyses of a Bayesian Network Approach and the 
Maximum Allele Count Method, 6 Forensic Science International: Genetics 689–696 (2012). 
121 See Allen (2017), supra note 6, for a critical discussion of this point. 
122 More generally, challenging and scrutinizing reported probabilities in practice is a 
question of auditing and disclosure, which in turn is a problem of regulation. 
123 Bruno de Finetti, Bayesianism: its Unifying Role for Both the Foundations and 
Applications of Statistics, 42 International Statistical Review (1974) 117–130, at 121.  
124 Among philosophers of science, this view is also known as ‘De Finetti’s mouse-
trap’: “Erzähle mir, welche Variante des Objektivismus du vertrittst, und ich will dir sagen, 
auf welchem Weg du in de Finettis Mausefalle gelangst!” (italics as in original)  
(Wolfgang Stegmüller, Das Problem der Induktion: Humes Herausforderung und moderne 
Antworten (1975), at 27). This can be translated as: “Tell me what variant of objectivism 
you support, and I will tell you in what way you fall into De Finetti’s mouse-trap.” Here 
Stegmüller argues that one cannot avoid to admit, at some point, that one is presupposing the 
notion of personal probability. Similarly, Howson & Urbach, supra note 16, argue that “(...) 
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an interpersonal agreement.125 For virulent critics of subjective probability, 
in both science and the law, this position might be offensive and inacceptable, 
for they regard objectivity as the ultimate virtue to which all human activity 
ought to aspire.126 Underlying these concerns is a rather stereotypical 
distinction between what is objective and what is not, and hence is, 
necessarily, unacceptably subjective – in the sense that a subjective statement 
could not, by definition, have any objective status.127 But the matter is more 
subtle than that. A brief comment thus is in order. 
The opposition between subjectivism and objectivism is not a recent 
observation.128 It was also at the centre of attention for the founders of 
subjective probability, such as de Finetti. Interestingly, the subjectivist de 
Finetti was not dismissive of objective notions, but insisted on carefully 
defining their scope. For example, he admitted that “(...) statements have 
objective meaning if one can say, on the basis of a well-determined 
observation (which is at least conceptually possible), whether they are either 
TRUE or FALSE”.129 More generally, objectivity in probability assessment 
                                               
the ideal of total objectivity is unattainable and that the classical methods, which pose as 
guardians of that ideal, in fact violated it at every turn; virtually none of those methods can 
be applied without a generous helping of personal judgement and arbitrary assumption” (at 
9). 
125 Even statisticians, whose mathematical methods might seem most suitable for 
‘objective’ approaches, clearly reject objectivism. Dennis V. Lindley, That Wretched Prior, 
1 Significance (2004), has noted: “Objectivity is merely subjectivity when nearly everyone 
agrees” (at 87); and for José M. Bernardo & Adrian F. M. Smith, Bayesian Theory (2000) 
“(...) objectivity has no meaning in this context apart from that pragmatically endowed by 
thinking of it as a shorthand for subjective consensus” (at 424).     
126 The quote in the title of this section is part of the following excerpt from de Finetti 
(1974), supra note 123: “Such ideas are however distressing for some people, who consider 
objectivity, in the strictest sense, as a necessary attribute of probability and of science. But 
regret for losing the faith in the perfect objectivity of probability, and hence of science, is 
unjustified. Nothing is lost but what was a mere illusion” (at 121). 
127 As argued by de Finetti, the opinion that well-defined notions must have an objective 
meaning is ill-conceived for as subjective notions can also be well-defined (Bruno de Finetti, 
Le Vrai et le Probable, 3 dialectica 78–92 (1949), at 81). 
128 Popper, for example, has noted: “The words ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are 
philosophical terms heavily burdened with a heritage of contradictory usages and of 
inconclusive and interminable discussions.” (Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, 2005, at 22) 
129 Supra note 7, at 5. De Finetti expressed the same idea previously as follows: “The 
only probability assessment that is ‘objectively fair’ or ‘objectively privileged’ or that 
‘belongs to the field of objective reality’ (...) would be that which would attribute probability 
1 to the events that will take place and the probability 0 to others” (De Finetti (1949), supra 
note 127, at 91) [italics as in original, translation by the authors; original: “La seule 
évaluation de probabilité ‘objectivement juste’ ou ‘objectivement jouissant d’une situation 
de privilège’ ou ‘appartenant au domaine de la réalité objective’ (...), serait celle qui 
attribuerait la probabilité 1 aux événements qui auront lieu et la probabilité 0 aux autres.”] 
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clearly was a concern for de Finetti, as he was mindful of how to 
meaningfully and justifiably assign probabilities, in the light of available 
evidence and knowledge. His decisional approach to probability assertion, 
using the method of scoring rules was his main instrument to approach this 
challenge.130 It is important to note that in this scoring rule scheme, the notion 
of ‘goodness’ of probability assertions does not relate to a supposed objective 
probability. Instead, ‘goodness’ is assessed by comparison to the truth-values 
of the uncertain events and, as mentioned above, de Finetti did not question 
that those truth values are objective.131 However, he opposed the idea of 
objectivism132 by which he referred to claims that ascribe to probability a 
meaning that is independent of the thinking individual – i.e. the existence of 
probability as a property of the outside world. 
In summary, thus, the genuine personal probabilities – in the de Finettian 
subjective sense – do and must, as suitably as possible, acknowledge and 
incorporate objective elements. This brings us back to de Finetti’s insistence 
on distinguishing between the definition of probability and the assignment of 
a probability in an individual case. Regarding this distinction, Carla Maria 
Galavotti, in her foreword to De Finetti’s philosophical lectures on 
probability, explains:  
“Unlike subjectivists, that do not confuse the definition and the 
evaluation of probability, upholders of the other interpretations 
do; they embrace a unique criterion – be it frequency or symmetry 
– and use it as grounds for both the definition and the evaluation 
of probability. They take a ‘rigid’ attitude towards probability, 
which implies a univocal choice of the probability function. On 
the contrary, the subjectivist approach is ‘elastic’, it does not 
commit the choice of one particular function to a single rule or 
method, but regards all coherent functions admissible.”133  
This versatile aspect of probability should look attractive for legal 
                                               
130 In his introductory lesson of a series of lectures held at the Institute of Advanced 
Mathematics in Rome (Italy) in 1979, de Finetti said: “I have asserted that the only serious 
device to talk about probability is the one based on proper scoring rules” (De Finetti (2008), 
supra note 25, at 9). Earlier traces of this view can be found in the 1960s, e.g., de Finetti 
(1962), supra note 108.  
131 Alberto Mura (2008), supra note 25, Editor’s Notes, at 13.  
132 For a detailed discussion de Finetti’s distinction between objectivity and objectivism, 
and references to his original works in Italian, see Galavotti (2018), supra note 98, at 153, 
and Maria Carla Galavotti, Subjectivism, Objectivism and Objectivity in De Finetti’s 
Bayesianism, in: David Corfield & Jon Williamson (Eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism, 
Applied Logic Series (2001), 161–174.  
133 Carla Maria Galavotti, De Finetti’s Philosophy of Probability, in: Bruno de Finetti 
(2008), supra note 25, at xx. 
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scholars who emphasize a pluralistic perspective to belief formation.134 They 
should also find value in the fact that, as Galavotti further explains, (de 
Finettian) subjectivism is an appeal to the careful appraisal of the multitude 
of sources of relevant information that one encounters, a view quite contrary 
to the misinterpretation of subjective probability as ‘anything goes’ opinions:  
“For de Finetti, the evaluation of probability is the result of a 
complex procedure involving both subjective and objective 
elements. Indeed, for him the explicit recognition of the role 
played by subjective elements within the formation of probability 
judgments is a prerequisite for the appraisal of objective elements. 
He always warned that the objective component of probability 
judgments, namely factual evidence, is in many respects context-
dependent: evidence must be collected carefully and skilfully 
[sic], its exploitation depending on the judgment on what 
elements are relevant to the problem under consideration and 
enter into the evaluation of probabilities. Furthermore, the 
collection and exploitation of evidence depend on economic 
considerations that vary according to the context. For all of these 
reasons, the exploitation of factual evidence involves subjective 
elements of various kinds.”135 
Ultimately, for de Finetti, this comprehensive perspective provides a 
decisive advantage for the subjectivist over the objectivist views, not least 
because – by their attempt to define single and unique criteria – objectivist 
approaches must necessarily ignore some aspects to the detriment of the value 
that these aspects could add, thus depriving evaluators from relevant 
information.136 The genuinely subjective account, instead, is always free to 
exploit the entirety of the thinking mind’s cognitive means and sources of 
information.137 In one of his many forceful commentaries, de Finetti has 
                                               
134 See, e.g., Allen (2015), supra note 85: “Fact finders come to trial with a vast 
storehouse of knowledge, beliefs, and modes of reasoning that are necessary to permit 
communication to occur simply and efficiently. (...) Everyone is just assumed to engage in 
orderly reasoning, employing all the necessary forms – deductive, inductive, abductive, 
statistical – as necessary or appropriate.” (at 79); and similarly, Ronald J. Allen, The 
Declining Utility of Analyzing Burdens of Persuasion, 48 Seton Hall Law Review 995–1015 
(2018): “fact finders employ their full panoply of cognitive tools” (at 998). 
135 Carla Maria Galavotti, supra note 133, at xx–xxi. 
136 The reductionist tendency of objectivist views is precisely the feeble point that critics 
of probability in the law have largely, uncompromisingly and, in our view, rightly exploited 
and exposed. 
137 In an overview of de Finetti’s works, Ludovico Piccinato, De Finett’s Logic of 
Uncertainty and its Impact on Statistical Thinking and Practice, in: Prem K. Goel & Arnold 
Zellner, Bayesian Inference and Decision Techniques, Essays in Honor of Bruno de Finetti, 
(1986) 13–30, has noted: “The inferential theory of de Finetti relies on some cornerstones 
which have a clear conceptual meaning, but the theory itself does not imply a complete and 
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expressed this view as follows: 
“Not being able to invent methods of synthesis comparable in 
power and insight to those of the human intuition, nor to construct 
miraculous robots capable of such, he [the objectivist] contents 
himself, willingly, with simplistic schematizations of very simple 
cases based on neglecting all knowledge except a unique element 
which lends itself to utilization in the crudest way.”138  
Again, this appeal to a person’s entirety of knowledge is compatible with 
how legal scholars view reasoning processes at trial, that is organic and 
operated by humans.139 
As a last and contemporary illustration of the inevitability of personal 
probabilities in the de Finettian sense, consider probabilities used in the 
context of forensic DNA evidence. In this field, figures are often referred to 
as objective (or, ‘statistical’) probabilities by both scientists and non-
scientists alike because – unlike in other forensic fields where relevant 
datasets are sparse – abundant genetic data are now widely available in 
specialist literature. However, as emphasized by Evett et al., there is nothing 
inherently objective in DNA profile probabilities assigned on the basis of 
such data: 
“There appears to be a fairly widespread misconception that there 
is a real “statistical probability” to be assigned to a [DNA] profile 
but this is not the case. There is an infinite range of ways of 
carrying out the calculation that underlies the figure given. The 
method chosen in the individual case must be seen to be as much 
a matter of opinion as one given in other areas of forensic science. 
The match probability is “personal”. It is based on what the 
scientist considers to be the most appropriate calculation given 
the circumstances of the case.”140 
 
E.  Corollaries for probability assertions and their scrutiny 
Though not unimportant, the debates over subjectivism and objectivism 
                                               
detailed system of procedures, similar to the current cookbooks of the standard literature.” 
(at 13) 
138 De Finetti (2008), supra note 25, at 7. 
139 E.g., Ronald J. Allen, On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: 
A Clarification of the “Naked Statistical Evidence” Debate, the Meaning of “Evidence,” and 
the Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 65 Tulane Law Review 1093–1110 
(1991) (“information content will be determined by a live human being exercising judgment 
organically rather than mechanically” at 1102). See also supra note 134. 
140 Ian Evett, Lindsey A. Foreman, Graham Jackson & James A. Lambert, DNA 
Profiling: a Discussion of Issues Relating to the Reporting of Very Small Match 
Probabilities, Criminal Law Review 341–355 (2000), at 346. 
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represent a marginal topic with little prospect of new arguments, mainly 
because the two notions are intertwined (with the latter being part of the 
former). More important are aspects such as honesty on the part of the person 
conducting an assessment, completeness of evidence and the elicitation of 
statements reflecting faithful representations. These aspects are particularly 
relevant in the context of expert witnesses testifying as to probability 
assignments. The decisionalist perspective to personal probability exposed 
throughout this paper lends itself to several remarks thereto.  
Truthfulness, for example, is widely considered as the ultimate virtue, but 
empirical means to pursue it are rather limited. Oath, for example, is at best 
an encouragement or an appeal to honesty, but no guarantee.141 The scoring 
rule scheme, too, might seem inapplicable at first sight because the recipient 
of a probabilistic assertion, prima facie, has no direct means to ‘know’ 
whether the asserted probability coincides with the person’s actual degree of 
belief. All that the external observer can hope for is that the person will act in 
her interest by honestly stating her probability – reporting this value is the 
optimal decision, as we have seen, because it is the one with the minimum 
expected score. What is more, since the ground truth is not known in a 
criminal trial – for otherwise there would be no litigated matter and no need 
to consult an expert or witness – there is no way to know how far from the 
truth a given probability assertion is.142 This does not mean, however, that a 
dishonest person has nothing to fear. Because her assertions expose her 
directly to her peers, she should care about the reasonableness of her 
opinions, and their faithful statement. Conceptually, such sincere reporting 
of scientific opinions is precisely the aim of considering probability 
assertions as decisions under a scoring rule scheme. Thus, an expert who 
intends to proceed responsibly and who wishes to avoid appearing 
unreasonable, should abstain from reporting an aleatory opinion.143 She 
should think carefully about what a competent expert’s opinion ought to be 
in the case at hand. This is an idealistic view of expert testimony that could 
face challenges such as partisan bias,144 and that is not immune to possible 
expert disagreements.145 Thus, in practice, procedural elements such as cross-
                                               
141 E.g., Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wisconsin Law Review 1113–1232 
(1991), at 1178.  
142 Indeed, as de Finetti (2008) has noted supra note 25: “If we knew where truth was, 
we would not get close to it, we would go straight there. And if we do not know where it is, 
we cannot even know how far it is from us.” (at 53) 
143 Recall that under the scoring rule scheme (§II.B.  ), reporting any value other than 
the one corresponding to one’s actual degree of belief is suboptimal. 
144 For a critical analysis with references back to, among others, Wigmore, see e.g. 
George C. Harris, Testimony on Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 
Pepperdine Law Review 1–74 (2000). 
145 As mentioned by Jackson et al. (2003), supra note 96, at 29, disagreement is not 
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examination and rebuttal require additional means for peer-reviewing and 
rationalizing the reporting of probabilities. 
Following discussion presented earlier in §I.C.  probability assertions 
ought to be accompanied by a justification, or an argument, because the 
recipient of expert information shall be able to understand how a particular 
opinion came to be, and on what evidence it is based. But there is a further 
dimension to this requirement. The recipient of expert information should 
also expect assistance in placing the expert’s statement within a wider 
context, by which we mean an explanation by the expert of how her opinion 
compares to that of other qualified witnesses in her field of expertise. This is 
a subtle means to probe the comprehensiveness of the expert’s knowledge 
and expertise in her field of specialty, or at least represents an incentive for 
her to self-critically assess the frontiers thereof. This is particularly crucial 
when the expert considers that her opinion is not in line with the view of peers 
in her field; it is important then to elicit the extent to which her opinion differs 
from mainstream views, and why (e.g., the expert may have more specialist 
knowledge and expertise than the average of experts in her field, maintain a 
different interpretation of available data or the state of the art, etc.).  
Inquiring about the foundations of expert opinions is important because, 
as we have explained, the liberal concept of probability as such does not 
prescribe any particular probability values, nor is there any ‘true’ 
probability.146 Thus, experts should consider it to be their duty to provide 
accompanying explanations, so as to help recipients of expert information 
absorb complex matters of scientific expertise, and judge their 
reasonableness.147,148 Where such information is not provided by experts, 
opinions should be challenged so as to elicit the required information.  
   
PART 3: DECISION STRUCTURES IN JURIDICAL EVIDENCE AND PROOF 
A.  Conceptual insufficiency of purely probabilistic standards of decision 
In scholarly discussions of evidence and proof standards, references to 
probability abound, used either as a qualitative verbal notion to express a 
                                               
necessarily a drawback because it can stimulate clarifying discussion. We provide further 
support for this argument in the paragraph that follows below. 
146 Supra note 47. 
147 Regarding the requirement of additional explanation, David H. Kaye, Clarifying the 
Burden of Persuasion: What Bayesian Decision Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 International 
Journal of Evidence & Proof 1–28 (1999), has argued: “(...) no mathematical result is self-
applying, and additional argument is necessary to bridge the gap from a general mathematical 
truth to a substantive application.” (at 27) 
148 This is not to be understood as a disguised argumentum ad populum. The fact that an 
opinion is to some extent representative of a relevant group of people, such as scientists, is 
not – as such – a credential that merits authority, but is a feature that decision makers may 
wish to know about.  
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person’s degree of uncertainty, or quantitatively as a minimum threshold 
required to reach a particular conclusion. Although there appears to be some 
consensus, at least in standard textbooks, on how expressions such as 
“preponderance of the evidence” (or “balance of probabilities”) in civil cases 
and “beyond reasonable doubt” in criminal cases might be expressed in 
quantitative probabilistic terms, ample empirical research shows that there is 
diversity in how different individuals, from different backgrounds (e.g., 
prospective jurors, judges, citizens), actually associate numbers and 
words.149,150 The difficulty appears to stem from two intertwined aspects: the 
first is the question of what is the exact probability threshold that ought to be 
reached in a given case, and the second aspect relates to the issue of 
‘knowing’ when exactly one has reached a particular probability. Throughout 
this paper, we have focused on the latter aspect, arguing that while – 
conceptually – one’s probability can be defined clearly, the nature of 
probabilities, their elicitation and assertion in practice can be further clarified 
and scrutinized through a decisional perspective. We shall now argue that this 
decisional perspective is also relevant for the former aspect, i.e. standards of 
decision. Specifically, we shall argue that traditional discourses about 
abstract probability thresholds are short-sighted in the sense that they 
misconceive the scope of the application of probability. 
To illustrate our view, let us take a closer look at the attempts to define 
or assert a specific probability (threshold) for a particular decision (i.e., 
conclusion or verdict). By definition, as we have argued, an asserted 
probability only expresses the degree of belief that a given person entertains 
about the truth or otherwise of a particular uncertain event (or, proposition), 
based on all the knowledge, data and evidence available to that person at the 
time she asserts her probability. Of course, there is nothing in the theory of 
probability that either prevents or encourages the definition of an ‘if–then 
rule’ of decision of the kind ‘if the probability of a particular proposition (e.g., 
Mr. A is the person who assaulted Mr. B) is greater than x, then decide so and 
so’. Legal literature abounds with arguments for the view that such rules may 
be unsuitable. Without going into the details of those objections, we agree 
                                               
149 E.g., Francis C. Dane, In Search of Reasonable Doubt: a Systematic Examination of 
Selected Quantification Approaches, 9 Law and Human Behavior (1985) 141–158; Jon O. 
Newman, Quantifying the Standard of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: a Comment on 
Three Comments, 5 Law, Probability & Risk 267–269 (2006); Rita J. Simon & Linda Mahan, 
Quantifying Burdens of Proof: a Review From the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 
Law and Society Review 319–330 (1971); Richard Seltzer, Russell F. Canan, Molly Cannon 
& Heidi Hansberry, Legal Standards by the Numbers, Quantifying Burdens of Proof or 
Search for Fool’s Gold?, 100 Judicature 56–66 (2016). 
150 This is also a well-known observation in psychological literature and applied contexts 
such as military and intelligence analyses. For a discussion and further references see, e.g., 
Winterfeldt & Edwards (1986), supra note 96, Chap. 4.2. 
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that crude ‘if (and only if)-then’ rules are unsuitable to make decisions for 
the simple reason that, strictly speaking, probability – in isolation – is not 
designed to warrant particular decisions. It is important, however, to be 
precise about what to conclude from this observation, and it is here that our 
view diverges from the criticism commonly leveled at legal probabilism. The 
standard critique is that probability as a whole is unsuitable for decision-
making in the law. In our view, however, it is a misconstruction to think that 
probability alone could logically warrant a particular decision; the criticism 
(of unsuitability) thus is essentially pointless because it blames the theory for 
something that it does not purport to do. The real problem, as we see it, is the 
failure of discussants to address the issue of standards of proof for what they 
are: questions of decision. Probability, as such, is only concerned with 
capturing and formally expressing uncertainty. It is a necessary but 
insufficient preliminary for making a decision. So rather than criticizing 
probability as such, attention should be drawn to the question of how to 
establish coherent uncertainty expressions – in terms of probability – as 
integral parts of formal procedures that lead to decisions. Supporters of the 
relative plausibility account of legal proof have worked on this aspect by 
discussing the role that probability may assume as one concept among others 
that is used in arriving at legal conclusions.151  
To some extent, it is surprising that discourse about abstract probability 
thresholds, and attempts to use them as unique decision criteria,152 are even 
entertained, because it is generally agreed that legal decisions involve many 
dimensions for which decision makers may seek optimisation.153 For 
example, it is widely argued that upon making a decision (e.g., rendering a 
verdict), one ought to think about the possible consequences of the decision 
and their relative merit or inconvenience, notions more commonly referred to 
as stakes. Such aspects are relevant in the law154 as much as in other contexts 
of societal, professional or personal decision-making. This is not to say that 
probabilistic decision thresholds cannot be defined; actually, they can be 
defined and there is a formal framework for this that allows one to take into 
account decision consequences and their relative (un-) desirability.155 While 
                                               
151 Allen (2017), supra note 6. Note, however, that the relative plausibility account 
provides a distinctive solution to the question of standards of proof by considering related 
burdens to be ordinal rather than a cardinal (e.g., Allen (1991), supra note 139, at 1096).  
152 Note that a similar observation has been made about objectivistic attempts to devise 
a single criterion for probability assignments (§II.D.  ). 
153 Allen (2015), supra note 85. 
154 An often-cited example is Justice Harlan’s concurrence to In re Winship 397 U.S. at 
370–371. 
155 The framework for the coherent formal processing of probabilities and utilities (or, 
losses) is decision theory. Its first detailed articulation for application in the law is widely 
attributed to Kaplan (1968), supra note 23.
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uncontroversial from a purely mathematical point of view, the application of 
this framework – especially the interpretation of the framework’s elements 
with respect to particular aspects of legal cases – has caused considerable 
debate among practitioners and academics.156 We will not reiterate this 
debate in full detail, nor will we take particular sides with one or the other of 
the pre-eminent positions.157 Instead, we will focus on what we call decision 
structures, which are based on selected elements of the formal (decision-
theoretic) framework that we consider capable of providing a conceptual and 
structural account of inference and decision problems in the law and 
(forensic) science. We will do so by adopting a historical perspective based 
on works of, among others, Bruno de Finetti. His views on the meaningful 
use of decision theory appear to be rarely acknowledged in the legal literature. 
We will point out how they can help construct arguments that do not raise the 
latent criticisms of decision theory in the legal context, and place the 
seemingly concurrent notions of probability and (relative) plausibility into 
perspective. 
 
B.  The inevitable elements of decision structures and their interpretation 
1. Elements of decision structures 
More than half a century ago, researchers from various fields engaged in 
the development of a lively area of investigation into questions of decision-
making where the consequences of decisions typically have monetary 
consequences and the aim is to elaborate optimal decisions with respect to 
well-defined criteria.158 In the decades that followed, mathematicians and 
statisticians, economists, psychologists and philosophers of science, among 
others, pursued decision-science research from prescriptive, descriptive and 
normative perspectives.159 The early contribution by legal scholars to formal 
                                               
156 For a careful introduction see, e.g., David Kaye (1999), supra note 147, and for a 
critical discussion Richard S. Bell, Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique of the 
Supreme Court’s Lawmaking for Burdens of Proof, 78 The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 557–585 (1987) for a critical discussion of the practical applications of 
Kaplan’s (1968), supra note 23, decision theoretic account. 
157 Some commentators even consider the debate to have exhausted itself (e.g., Allen 
(2018), supra note 134). 
158 E.g., Herman Chernoff & Lincoln E. Moses, Elementary Decision Theory (1959), 
Irving J. Good, Rational Decisions, 14 Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 
(Methodological) (1952) 107–114 (mentioning applications in the law at 112–113) and 
Robert Schlaifer, Analysis of Decisions Under Uncertainty (1969). 
159 E.g., A Science of Decision-Making, The Legacy of Ward Edwards, Jie W. Weiss & 
David J. Weiss (Eds.) (2009); Advances in Decision Analysis, From Foundations to 
Applications, Ward Edwards, Ralph F. Miles, Jr. & Detlof von Winterfeldt (Eds.) (2007); 
Johnathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding, Fourth Edition (2008). 
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decision-oriented research is illustrated by the work of Kaplan.160 His work 
is remarkable and still a highly recommendable read today because of his 
capacity to express complex matters in accessible terms. Kaplan described 
the formal decision-analytic viewpoint as follows: 
“Put in its most abstract form, the typical decision-theory problem 
involves the proper course of action to be taken by a 
decisionmaker who may gain or lose by taking action upon 
uncertain data that inconclusively support or discredit differing 
hypotheses about the state of the real but nonetheless unknowable 
world.”161 
As is clear from this statement, the problem is essentially one of decision 
making under uncertainty, i.e. choosing a course of action when one does not 
know which state of the world actually holds, though one may have some – 
most often incomplete – evidence about it. These elements are fundamental 
and inevitable in the sense that they are encountered by any decision maker 
and cannot be discussed away.162 
Matters become more intricate and controversial in discussions about the 
application of the theory, especially the quantification of uncertainties using 
(subjective) probabilities, the valuation of consequences (through utilities or 
losses) and the combination of these elements through computations of 
expected value; i.e., expected utility (or, loss). Expected value provides a 
measure that allows one to compare competing decisions and provide the 
basis for decision criteria, such as the maximisation (minimsation) of 
expected utility (loss). The mathematical structure of these notions is not 
controversial. However, debates arose over what exactly these notions can 
add to the understanding and practice of proof processes. The extensive 
exchanges between Professors Ronald J. Allen and David H. Kaye provide a 
detailed account of the intricate matters and perspectives involved. Professor 
Kaye, for example, places an emphasis on the capacity of the theory to serve 
as a logically rigorous analytical method.163,164 Though not denying this 
feature, Professor Allen focuses on the descriptive capacity of theories to 
provide satisfactory accounts of the actual working of the legal process and 
                                               
160 Kaplan (1968), supra note 23. 
161 Supra note 23, at 1065. 
162 Note that not making a decision is also a decision. 
163 E.g., Kaye (1999), supra note 147. 
164 Note that, for example, decision theory postulates coherence relationships between 
probabilistic beliefs about the truth of competing hypotheses and preferences among decision 
consequences. Specifically, it is possible to show that, given suitable assumptions, decision 
theory leads to the probabilistic decision threshold of 0.5 for the simple civil case, and higher 
thresholds for other cases (e.g., criminal). For discussions of particular thresholds see, e.g., 
Friedman (1997), supra note 24, Friedman (2017), supra note 16, and Edward K. Cheng, 
Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 The Yale Law Journal 1254–1279 (2013). 
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the individuals involved, especially what they are actually able to do, in terms 
of their mental (unaided) computational capacities. Regarding this aspect, he 
considers decision theory and expected value computations as unsuitable.165 
These disagreements concern the implications of particular results when 
applying decision theory in its full force.166 And yet, the problem is almost 
universally considered – even among critical commentators of mathematical 
approaches167 – as one of decision under uncertainty. No one denies that 
decisions must be taken,168 that decisions have consequences of varying 
desirability (i.e., accurate and erroneous decision outcomes), and that we 
usually are uncertain about which consequence exactly will follow our action. 
The fundamental point is that we can identify these elements at various stages 
of action in the legal process and it is for this reason that we refer to those 
elements as forming fundamental decision structures, or the anatomy of 
decisions. Our main argument in this paper is that this decisional nature of 
particular aspects of legal proof is of wider significance as it can also serve 
to critically analyse the notions of probability and relative plausibility. We 
shall now provide a sketch of these decision structures to illustrate the 
commonalities of their underlying tenets. 
2. General decision structures in verdicts and assertions of probability and 
relative plausibility 
We start out by considering the most widely recognised decision 
structure, concerning ultimate issues. A trier of fact is presented with one 
side’s (e.g., plaintiff or prosecution, P for short) allegation, and an opponent’s 
(i.e., defendant’s, D for short) contradiction of that allegation. An example 
for a civil case could be a claim in which the plaintiff seeks to prove that he 
suffered an injury as a result of a negligent act by the defendant. Decisions in 
favour of one side or the other may lead to accurate or erroneous outcomes 
(i.e., decision consequences), depending on whether or not P’s or D’s 
allegation is true. Accurate decision consequences – i.e. factually correct 
findings – are preferred to erroneous findings, and possibly there is also a 
preference ordering among the erroneous findings (e.g., a false conviction in 
a criminal case is usually considered worse than a false acquittal). The 
anatomy of this decision problem thus consists of verdicts (i.e., decisions or 
possible courses of action), states of nature (i.e., the parties’ allegations or 
                                               
165 E.g., Ronald J. Allen, The Error of Expected Loss Minimization, 2 Law Probability 
& Risk 1–7 (2003). 
166 Friedman (1997), supra note 24, has made the same observation regarding the 
application of probability and Bayes’ theorem (“the theory need not be applied in its most 
powerful gear”, at 288). 
167 E.g., Allen & Pardo (2018), supra note 5, (“virtually all (probably all, actually) 
juridical fact finding is done under conditions of uncertainty”, at 9). 
168 See also §I.D.  and supra note 67. 
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‘stories’) and decision consequences. 
Keeping the logic of this decision structure in mind, we can now see that 
there is no difference, in principle, with the idea of probability as a decision 
presented in §II.B.  169 A person required to assert a probability a regarding 
an event E must decide on a particular value and do so in a state of incomplete 
knowledge about whether or not E is true. As shown in Figure 3, read from 
left to right, the consequence of asserting probability a will result in a 
distance with respect to the truth-value of event E. This distance is zero if one 
asserts a equal to 1 (0) when E is true (false). The desirability of the various 
outcomes is expressed through a positive score (shown on the far right-hand 
side in Figure 3). This score is given by the square of the difference between 
the asserted probability a and the actual truth-value of the event E. The 
decomposition of probability assertion as shown in Figure 3 is known as a 
decision tree. Note that there is a further dimension to decision tree analysis 
known as ‘folding back’. It consists in computing the expected score (ES) for 
each decision a,170 obtained by weighing the score of each decision outcome 
by its probability of occurrence, and summing the products thus obtained. As 
outlined in §II.B.  the optimal decision a, i.e. the decision with the minimum 
ES, is the one that corresponds to one’s probability of the event E. We shall 
not repeat the full development of this computational level at this point 




Figure 3: Decision structure for asserting a probability a for an event of interest, E, which 
                                               
169 See Michael J. Saks & Samantha L. Neufeld, Convergent Evolution in Law and 
Science: the Structure of Decision-Making Under Uncertainty, 10 Law, Probability & Risk 
133–148 (2011) for a comparison between legal decision-making and scientific (i.e., classic) 
hypothesis testing. The authors find that there is little cross-fertilization between the two 
fields. This is unsurprising, given their restricted focus on frequentist hypothesis testing, 
leaving aside the decision-theoretic account that we consider in this paper. 
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may either be true or false. The difference between the asserted probability a and the 
truth-value of E, i.e. the decision outcome, is valued in terms of a score given by the 
squared difference between the asserted probability and the truth-values 1 and 0, 
respectively, of event E. Note that, formally, this representation is a partial decision tree 
because probabilities for states of nature and computations of expected scores are not 
included. 
 
The structural analogy between the above examples is insightful because, 
prima facie, decisions concerning ultimate issues and the assignment of a 
probability for an uncertain event may appear to be quite different tasks. 
Notwithstanding, it is clear that – analytically – conclusions in favor of the 
plaintiff’s (P) and defendant’s (D) accounts can be represented in a tree-like 
form of the kind shown in Figure 3, reduced to two decision branches. In turn, 
the real-world states would be the actual truth of either P’s or D’s account, 
leading to accurate and erroneous findings for P and D, respectively, depicted 
on the far right-hand side of the decision tree. 
These analogies raise the question of how the decisional view of key 
operational tasks in legal processes relates to other perspectives, such Allen 
and Pardo’s relative plausibility account of the structure of juridical proof. At 
its core, their account amounts to evaluating the parties’ allegations through 
considerations such as coherence, completeness and consistency, and 
engaging in a deliberative process of assessing the congruence of the 
presented evidence with the competing versions of the contested events, 
using the fact-finder’s entirety of knowledge, background information and 
cognitive capacity.171 In terms of its structural elements, this account appears 
to involve the same elements as the general decision structure for ultimate 
issues sketched above:172 a decision needs to be made for one of the 
competing stories, yet this decision is made in light of incomplete knowledge 
about the actual state of the world, thus leading to uncertainty about the 
correctness of the decision being made.  
In broad terms, the relationship between relative plausibility and the 
decisional perspective may be perceived in at least two ways. One possibility 
is to consider relative plausibility as the argumentative background, 
justification and support for a fact-finder’s selection of one of the available 
decisions (i.e., the finding for P or D, respectively). According to this view, 
the fundamental decision structure regarding ultimate issues is the one 
presented at the beginning of this section, with relative plausibility providing 
the explanation of the fact-finder’s decision. A second possibility is to 
consider relative plausibility judgments as decisions in their own right. This 
view appears quite compatible with how Allen and Pardo circumscribe 
                                               
171 E.g., Allen (2017), supra note 6, at 140. 
172 To some extent, this is little surprising, since relative plausibility is specifically 
designed to capture, descriptively, decision-making regarding ultimate issues. 
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relative plausibility theory. Specifically, they note:  
“The “relative plausibility” theory explains the process as 
involving reasoning put to the effort of deciding the relative 
plausibility of the parties’ various explanations of the evidence 
and contested events.” [emphasis added]173  
Thus, understanding the identification, selection and assertion of the most 
plausible account as a decision under uncertainty can be graphically 
conveyed in terms of the decision tree shown in Figure 4. Note again that we 
focus only on a qualitative representation of the three essential elements that 
the decision maker faces: an exhaustive list of decisions (among which one 
element must be chosen), states of nature (though it is unknown which state 
of nature is actually true)174 and decision consequences (outcomes). The 
decision tree represents these elements in natural flow, from left to right, thus 
providing an anatomy of the decision problem. 
 
Figure 4: Representation of the designation of the most plausible account as a decision 
under uncertainty. 
 
So far, our analysis has essentially been descriptive.175 Besides, we have 
left the quantitative part of decision trees intentionally aside because – 
historically – it involves aspects over which legal scholars disagree. Instead, 
our aim was to delineate the inevitable structural aspects with which, 
hopefully, most discussants would agree. In this sense, the decision tree 
representation helps clarify where exactly current debates align and diverge. 
We work out these distinctions in some further detail below. 
3. Reconsidering the interpretation of decision-theoretic advice 
Proponents of the full decision-theoretic perspective would find the 
decision tree shown in Figure 4 incomplete because it does not provide an 
explicit criterion for selecting one particular course of action over an 
                                               
173 Allen & Pardo (2018), supra note 5, at 6. 
174 As an aside, note that if there were no uncertainty about the state of nature, there 
would be no decision problem in the first place: one would directly select the decision that 
leads to an accurate outcome. 
175 Also, we have restricted our analysis to a simple civil case. The relative plausibility 
reasoning scheme for the criminal case is more elaborate and goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. It is part of the authors’ ongoing research. 
Choose P as the most
plausible account
Decision: designating the 
most plausible account state of nature outcome
P is true
D is true
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alternative. Developing the decision tree in its complete form would require 
the assignment of utilities (or losses) for decision outcomes (at the far right-
hand side of the tree) and of probabilities for the possible states of nature. 
Proponents of decision theory would use these elements to compute the 
expected utility (or loss) for each decision (i.e., assertion of the most plausible 
account), and then decide based on consideration of the decision with the 
maximum (minimum) expected utility (loss).176 However, the framing of 
legal decision criteria based on the notion of expected value is a contested 
topic.177 It is worthwhile, thus, to devote some discussion to it. It is at this 
point that we introduce a critical reflection on decision-theoretic guidance 
from a historical perspective. 
Classic decision theory identifies the best decision as the one which 
maximizes (minimizes) the fact-finder’s expected utility (loss). Leaving aside 
technical aspects regarding the nature and feasibility of probability and utility 
assignment (which are necessary for computing expected values), the 
contested issue appears to be how to interpret decision-theoretic results in 
practical applications, such as the law. From one point of view, determining 
the decision(s)178 with the maximum (minimum) expected utility (loss) is a 
mere technical operation with some computational burden. However, an 
additional step is involved until an actual decision is made in practice, and it 
is legitimate to ask to what extent decision makers are willing to base their 
decisions on the sole consideration of decision-theoretic advice. This, in turn, 
raises the broader question of how to understand normative179 theories, of 
which decision theory is a prominent example. A widely held view is that, by 
its nature, a normative account is an imperative for what ought to be done, 
i.e. what one ought to decide. Presumably, it is this strict interpretation180 of 
                                               
176 E.g, Cheng (2013), supra note 164. Note that the scoring rule development presented 
in §II.B.  is based on this idea. According to this scheme the optimal value to report as a 
probability is the value a that minimizes the expected score. 
177 Allen (2003), supra note 165.  
178 We include the plural because there may be more than one decision with maximum 
(minimum) expected utility (loss). 
179 In the context here, the term ‘normative’ does not refer to a legal norm or principle. 
Instead the meaning is that admitted in the disciplines of judgment and decision-making in 
applied psychology and artificial intelligence, among others, that rely on philosophical and 
mathematical arguments to define (logical) standards of evaluation. These so-called 
normative models are developed and justified independently of observable decision 
behavior, and make no claim to describe how people actually behave (e.g., Johnathan Baron 
(2012), The Point of Normative Models in Judgment and Decision Making, 3 Frontiers in 
Psychology 1–3 (2012); Eric J. Horvitz, John S. Breese & Max Henrion, Decision Theory in 
Expert Systems and Artificial Intelligence, 2 International Journal of Approximate 
Reasoning 247–302 (1988)).  
180 Historically, strictly prescriptive interpretations were also promoted for the use of 
probability theory as a standard for reasoning under uncertainty in the law, a view known a 
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normative models in the law that provokes objections among legal scholars. 
The question of how to interpret normative theories is not specific to the law, 
however, as it has also been a concern for probability and decision theorists, 
at least since half a century ago, and it is instructive to attend to some of their 
views. A noteworthy example is the position of de Finetti, whose decisional 
account was presented in §II.B.  Although considered by some as a radical 
probabilist,181 he favored a well reflected and balanced view of decision 
theory. He explicitly recognized the interpretation of a normative theory as a 
“compendium of mandatory prescriptions”182 as problematic because it 
would lead to a suppression of freedom of choice. Recognizing critiques of 
strict normativism, de Finetti considered it necessary to view normative 
advice as conditional: 
“(...) I consider the criticisms of aspects of a theory that contain 
something rigidly normative as justified, while the normative 
character in the conditional sense must be considered not only 
acceptable but necessary.” 183 
Thus, according to de Finetti, a decision-theoretic result should serve not 
as a prescription, but as a conditional advice, contributing to the entirety of 
considerations taken into account by the decision maker, prior to making a 
decision: 
“(...) it is not a question of prescribing anything, but only of giving 
each person a tool to enable them to better analyze and compare 
the pros and cons of each decision according to their own point 
of view, before choosing.”184 
                                               
‘Bayesian imperialism’ (e.g., Ward Edwards, Influence Diagrams, Bayesian Imperialism and 
the Collins Case: an Appeal to Reason, 13 Cardozo Law Review 1025–1074 (1991)). 
181 Maria Carla Galavotti (Ed.), Bruno de Finetti, Radical Probabilist (2009). Even de 
Finetti himself, on occasion, used the word ‘radical’ (e.g., “the radical nature of certain of 
my theses”, de Finetti, supra note 7, at xvii). 
182 [transl. by the authors; original: “recueil de prescriptions obligatoires”] Bruno de 
Finetti, Dans quel sens la théorie de la décision est-elle et doit-elle être “normative”, 
Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, “La Décision”, 
Paris (25–30 May 1960), 159–169, p. 163. 
183 Id. [translation by the authors; original: “(...) je considère justifiées les critiques à des 
aspects d’une théorie qui contiendraient quelque chose de rigidement normatif, tandis que le 
caractère normatif dans le sens conditionnel doit être considéré non seulement acceptable 
mais nécessaire.”] 
184 Id. [translation by the authors; original: “(...) il ne s’agit nullement de prescrire quoi 
que ce soit, mais seulement de donner à chacun un outil pour lui permettre de mieux analyser 
et de comparer le pour et le contre de chaque décision selon le point de vue qui lui est propre, 
avant de choisir.”] Similarly, Jim Q. Smith has noted: “The analyst’s task is never to tell the 
DM [decision maker] what to do but to provide frameworks to help her creatively explore 
her problem and to come to a reasoned decision she herself owns (...)” (Jim Q. Smith, 
Bayesian Decision Analysis, Principles and Practice (2010), at p. 26). 
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As we have argued elsewhere,185 this perspective seems well compatible 
with the relative plausibility account, according to which participants in the 
legal process rely on a broad scope of cognitive devices and strategies in their 
reasoning and decision-making activities.  
4. Numeracy and the quest for practicality 
Critical readers might ask how a theory can produce advice of any kind if 
it is based on formulae that involve numerical components for which no 
guidance is offered regarding how to assign them. Bell, for example, has 
noted that the formula proposed by Kaplan186 “does not rationalize any 
particular standard of proof unless values are assigned to the variables”187. 
Apart from being a truism, this critique of a formula is in fact a critique of 
the concept of utility on which the formula is built. The assignment of utilities 
is a notoriously difficult topic, a difficulty we do not deny. Notwithstanding, 
it is important to be clear as to the exact purpose of the notion of utility: in 
essence, it is a number that expresses the value a person assigns to a particular 
decision consequence (i.e., outcome).188 Thus, utility is operationalised only 
through its application by a person who uses it to express her preferences 
between decision consequences. Any mechanism of autonomous value 
assignment would make the concept vacuous, as it would deprive it from the 
very purpose it is designed for: helping persons to make a value assignment.  
It is sometimes suggested that, as a consequence of the difficulty of 
assigning utilities, the concept should be abandoned altogether. One is free, 
of course, to disregard the concept of utility, but this would not make the 
problem disappear. One would still face the inevitable reality that decisions 
do have consequences and that we do have varying preferences between those 
consequences. Any formal approach to the problem would require one to 
provide a means to capture the value of decision consequences. Utility is one 
such means. Again, critics may question whether a single number (i.e., utility) 
can meaningfully capture something so complex as the value of decision 
consequences in legal applications. Admittedly, a single-valued utility may 
be considered as a simplistic measure, but how could we ever pretend to 
employ a more elaborate measure if we cannot even handle a simple 
                                               
185 Alex Biedermann, Silvia Bozza & Franco Taroni, Normative Decision Analysis in 
Forensic Science, Artificial Intelligence and Law (forthcoming). 
186 Kaplan (1968), supra note 23, at 1072. Kaplan’s formula specifies the threshold 
probability necessary to warrant a particular legal conclusion as a function of personal 
preferences among the various possible decision outcomes, expressed in terms of what he 
called “disutilities or regrets” (at 1079).  
187 Bell (1987), supra note 156, at 560–561. 
188 Utility (a number) expresses the relative strength of preferences, though expressing 
preferences as an ordering is enough (ordinal utility). 
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measure?189 
Although it is worthwhile scrutinizing assignments of particular 
numerical values, it would be inappropriate to consider ‘hard’ numerical 
assignments as a necessary requirement to make decision-theoretic formulae 
useful.190 To illustrate this point, consider the well-known result that, in the 
ordinary civil case, Kaplan’s191 formula leads to the threshold probability of 
>0.5 when an erroneous finding for either party is assigned the same disutility 
(e.g., a symmetric 0-k loss function).192 This value, >0.5, is widely considered 
as the numerical expression of the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard 
for the typical civil case.193 This is not the main point, however, since the 
formula shows more than this. Even without settling for particular numbers, 
increasing the loss value assigned for the adverse result of one decision, 
compared to the loss value assigned to the adverse consequence that can 
potentially result from the alternative decision, will lead to an increase of said 
threshold probability (above 0.5) – as commonly required in the context of 
criminal cases. Friedman has concisely summarised these qualitative 
relationships as follows: 
“Suppose that Option One has far worse consequences if wrong 
than does Option Two. Then a sensible decision-maker will 
choose Option One rather than Option Two only if she has a high 
degree of confidence that Option One rather than Option Two is 
correct, or, put another way, only if she thinks Option One is far 
more probable than Option Two.”194 
More informally, the decision-theoretic criterion thus appears to capture 
the common intuition that ‘the more is at stake, the more one shall be sure 
before one decides’, that is the understanding that one’s decision is, broadly 
speaking, a ‘weighing’ of relative strengths of belief (i.e., the extent to which 
one is convinced of the truth or otherwise of competing propositions) against 
                                               
189 Lindley (1985), supra note 47, at 65 (“The truth of the matter is that people dislike 
simple problems: they like to take refuge in complicated ones where inadequacies of their 
procedures are difficult to challenge because of the obscurity generated by complication. (...) 
The reply to the accusation of guessing at probabilities and utilities is simply that if you can’t 
do simple problems, how can you do complicated ones?”). 
190 More generally, numeracy is not considered a necessary component of juridical proof 
for some accounts, such as the relative plausibility account, are explicitly non-numerical. 
191 Kaplan (1968), supra note 23, at 1072. 
192 E.g., Kaye (1999), supra note 147, at 1. 
193 Some scholars consider this assumption mistaken (e.g., Allen & Pardo (2018), supra 
note 5, and Michael Pardo, The Paradoxes of Legal Proof: A Critical Guide, 99 Boston 
University Law Review 233–290 (2019)). 
194 Friedman (2018), supra note 9, at 1590 
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relative losses.195,196 Clearly, this qualitative relationship can be considered at 
various levels of detail, as argued by Friedman: “The concept of magnitude 
is essential. (...) we need to have a sense of how much worse one error is than 
the other.”197 
In combination, the above strains of argument emphasize the analytical 
nature of the decision-theoretic perspective and its role in providing a 
structured way of thinking about problems, in a conditionally advisory sense, 
as compared to accounts that focus primarily on providing a descriptive 
account of decision behaviour, or the functioning of a system.198 Further, the 
non-prescriptive interpretation of the formal decision-theoretic perspective 
avoids the reduction of practical decisions to purely mathematical questions, 
as critics may invoke. Specifically, it does not intend to delegate decision 
competence or decision prerogatives to an abstract criterion or a theory. 
Instead, the purpose of conditional decision-theoretic advice is to question 
and scrutinise one’s consistency relationships (i.e., coherence) among 
(probabilistic) beliefs and value assignments for decision consequences, in 
particular adverse outcomes, and make these considerations formally precise, 
so as to help justify particular lines of reasoning or conclusions.  
 
PART 4: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Past and contemporary debates among legal scholars on the nature, 
substance and form of evidence evaluation and proof processes in the law 
show a stark tendency to develop comprehensive theories. The construction 
of such theories is ambitious, however, and the various participants to the 
discussion have found their counterparts’ accounts deficient in various 
respects, highlighted often in intense discussions over detailed aspects – 
provoking equally detailed replies and rebuttals.199 As argued in a recent 
work by Professor Michael Pardo,200 too often, there has been a focus on 
treating problems in isolation, thus making it difficult to see connections 
between and broader dimensions of the different concepts.  
                                               
195 Biedermann et al. (2018), supra note 185.  
196 This is a formal argument in support of the view that purely probabilistic criteria are 
conceptually insufficient for warranting decisions (see also §3.A.  ). 
197 Friedman (2018), supra note 9, at 1590. 
198 This does not mean, however, that the formal decision-theoretic account does not 
offer descriptive potential. As noted above, it is indeed capable of providing a rationale for 
some common understandings of standards of proof, especially their numerical (i.e., 
probabilistic) components and the valuation of decision consequences (i.e., their relative 
adversity).  
199 Some commentators consider that, over the past few decades, the discussions have 
exhausted themselves and that the various sides merely retreat to (re-)affirming their 
established positions (e.g., Allen (2018), supra note 134; Friedman (2018), supra note 9). 
200 Michael Pardo (2018), supra note 193. 
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One area where this difficulty arises is the nature and role of probability 
in the legal process. It is often said, for example, that the rules of probability 
map poorly onto the way in which people actually think (when unaided from 
a cognitive standpoint). Although being an empirical truth,201 this does not – 
as we have argued through this paper – impede on the core of probability 
theory for the latter does not claim to provide a descriptive account. Similarly, 
no one would find arithmetic operations of addition and subtraction 
unsuitable simply because some people find them difficult to operate or 
understand.202 Thus, critiques should be tailored to what the respective 
accounts actually purport to do, and proponents of particular accounts – 
especially probabilists – should be careful not to overinterpret the scope of 
applicability of their accounts.203 Better delineating the potential and scope 
of formal methods of reasoning and decision analysis should help us (i) 
further the understanding and clarify key aspects of legal proof and decision 
processes, (ii) prevent unjustified criticisms and (iii) shed more light on ways 
in which distinct concepts can beneficially interact so as to offer solutions 
that go beyond what individual accounts may be able to provide in isolation. 
This article started from the premise that if particular formal concepts, 
especially probability and decision theory, have a place within the broad 
scope of cognitive devices used in applied contexts such as the law, it remains 
important to address the recurrent criticism to which these concepts are 
exposed. Despite the fact that this might be perceived as treating 
individualised and local problems, resolving these issues remains an 
important preliminary to deploying the full potential of the various concepts.  
This article makes three contributions in this regard. The first is a critical 
review and discussion of recurrent critiques of probability. The second is the 
presentation of a historically important and logically well founded, but in the 
law largely unknown, account of probability. It is based on the idea of 
encouraging individuals to take responsibility for their quantifications of 
uncertainty, by viewing probability assertion as a decision, rather than a 
deference to abstract definitions that conflate the definition of probability 
with its assessment in actual cases, which encounters operational difficulties. 
The third contribution emphasizes the conceptual relationship between this 
decisional perspective of probability and other notions and decision points in 
the legal process. Here our argument focuses on what we call decision 
                                               
201 E.g., Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, Judgement Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1982). 
202 But clearly, if you are supposed to receive two payments of 100$, but your bank 
decides to increase your account only by 180$, it will be in your interest to insist on receiving 
the full amount of 100$+100$=200$, unless you are willing to lose the difference of 20$. 
You are free, of course, to ignore advice of formal analyses, but this liberty comes at a price. 
203 Allen (2015), supra note 85.  
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structures that represent the minimal anatomy of decision problems as they 
appear to all discussants, irrespective of the position from which they argue. 
In analysing these decision structures, we invoke elements of classic decision 
theory, but emphasise the need to interpret them carefully. Here, too, we 
adopt a historical perspective and rely on foundational literature to argue 
against overinterpreting results of normative analyses in a rigidly prescriptive 
sense. We identify such overinterpretation as a further source of controversies 
over the role of probability and decision theory in the law. 
  Regarding our first topic of inquiry, probability interpretations in the 
law, we found it inevitable to review the divide between objectivist and 
subjectivist viewpoints, both of which face distinct critiques. While we agree 
with the shortcomings and limitations of objectivist accounts of probability, 
which demonstrate their illusionary goals and self-defeating character, we 
insist on considering these complications not as a drawback of probability as 
such, but only as a deficiency of a particular interpretation of probability. 
This leaves the subjectivist interpretation of probability as a remaining 
option,204 though it is not free of attracting its own critiques. Among the most 
widely known critique is the sentiment that ‘subjective’ means allowance of 
arbitrary and unconstrained assertions, in the sense of ‘anything goes’, in 
ignorance of any available evidence. Where probability assertions indeed 
exhibit these shortages, legal scholars and practitioners are right to expose 
and denounce them.205 In such instances, however, their critiques do not 
address an inadequacy of subjective probability, but a misapprehension of 
what it really means to understand and apply probability in terms of 
subjective degrees of belief. We have illustrated this through an analysis and 
discussion of relevant historical sources that depict an image of subjective 
probability, based on the notion of justified assertion, that is quite different 
from how it is exposed in standard critiques. While we concede that, in 
general, probability is a very liberal concept with rather few constraints, apart 
from requirements of consistency, it is desirable to conceive of a way to 
encourage honest and well-reflected probability assertions.  
This has led us to our second and main topic of inquiry: the understanding 
of probability assertion as a decision. The decisionalization of probability, as 
we call it, highlights the idea that asserting probabilities should be assessed 
carefully, making the best use of all relevant available data, knowledge and 
                                               
204 Although critical of all interpretations of probability, Professor Allen on at least one 
occasion has noted that “[none] of the conceptualizations of probability except probability 
as subjective degrees of belief can function at trial.” (Ronald J. Allen, Taming Complexity: 
Rationality, the Law of Evidence and the Nature of the Legal System, 12 Law, Probability 
& Risk 99–113 (2013), at 104). 
205 For discussion of this observation in probability applications by forensic scientists, 
see Biedermann (2017), supra note 52, at 478–479. 
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information – in a way that can be disclosed and audited. The underlying 
formal development, based on (proper) scoring rules, is rather well-known in 
the history of subjective probability, but rarely invoked in legal literature and 
science other than some areas involving the elicitation of expert opinions and 
the evaluation of forecasters. The reasons for this are, supposedly, its 
uncompromising rigour and intricacy. Clearly, thus, our suggestion here is 
not to introduce probability elicitation based on scoring rules in practical 
proceedings. We have invoked scoring rules solely for the purpose of 
showing that there is a way to formalise the intuition of considering 
probability assertion as a decision, with the interesting result that one should 
not – under a proper scoring rule – decide to report a distorted probability 
that does not correspond to one’s actual belief (e.g., rounding off a small 
probability to zero). Notwithstanding, scientific (e.g., forensic) experts may 
be expected to know about and understand the related theory.206 The practical 
avenues for this perspective remain vague, however, since there is no 
structured approach to probability in science; there remains a strong tradition 
of educating scientists in mainstream accounts207 of probability, without 
informing them enough about the conceptual limitations of these approaches, 
let alone exposing them to critical methodological enquiry about foundational 
concepts – areas often considered too far from practical consideration and, at 
best, to be left to the scrutiny of philosophers of science or statisticians with 
special interests.208  
A further reason why we have introduced the decisional perspective to 
probability is that it is merely a particular instance of the application of classic 
decision theory that reveals structural analogies with respect to other stages 
of juridical evidential assessment. Having clarified how it structures the logic 
of probability assignment in terms of fundamental ingredients such as 
decisions, uncertain states of nature, and decision consequences, we have 
argued in part 3 that the logic of the decisional perspective is not 
fundamentally different from typical legal decision problems, such as 
decisions about ultimate issues at trial. While we recognise that the 
application of formal decision-theoretic analyses in the law is a controversial 
topic in legal scholarship, we identify one root of this controversy in 
disagreements over the deeper point of how to understand results of formal, 
conceptually normative and analytical accounts, as opposed to descriptive 
theories of how (legal) systems actually work and of observable decision 
behaviour of people operating in such systems. In our view, the question is 
not whether or not litigants or legal processes in general are or ought to be 
                                               
206 Biedermann (2013), supra note 118. 
207 So-called “cookbooks of the standard literature” (Piccinato (1986), supra note 137, at 
13) or “Adhockeries” (de Finetti (2017), supra note 7, at 11). 
208 Lad (1996), supra note 88.
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acting in agreement with the results of formal decision-theoretic analyses. 
The theory (of decision) is more general: the point is that it provides a 
framework that allows one to subject any decision – whether it is one’s own 
decision or that of others – to a formal analysis independently of whether or 
not one actually endorses the theory. The result of such analyses will not pre-
empt or prescribe any particular decision, but represent advice that will add 
to the entire scope of considerations upon which a practical decision is based. 
As an aside, these analyses expose traditional discourses that treat standards 
of decision coarsely as purely probabilistic thresholds, as conceptually 
incomplete because they do not explicitly address the valuation of uncertain 
decision consequences, some of which may be adverse. 
In conclusion, we find that the decisional perspective supports a logically 
sound and analytically rigorous examination of underlying threads and 
commonalities of key topics – i.e., probability assertion, plausibility 
assessment and legal conclusions about ultimate issues – that otherwise tend 
to be dealt with in literature either individually or in opposing ways.  A better 
appreciation of the various concepts’ respective scope of capacities and 
limitations should help us to use them in more defensible and complementary 
ways. In particular, the competing accounts’ descriptive, normative and 
interpretative properties require careful attention, as we have shown, to avoid 
misconceived critiques and overinterpretation of theories beyond their 
domain of competence. 
 
 
 
